Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Sprache: | en |
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Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2007
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| _version_ | 1876432782839775232 |
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| author | Josep L. PRADES |
| author_facet | Josep L. PRADES |
| contents | Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action Josep L. PRADES Filosofía self reasons knowledge Intentional action practical reasoning In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional action presents a certain unresolved tension. On the one hand, the epistemic privilege of the first person derives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of the subject endorsing a course of action. An endorsing subject is not a mere observer of her intentions. On the other hand, the transparency of endorsement is assimilated to the putative fact that an agent forms her intentions by reflecting on the reasons to make up her mind. The resulting picture is an extremely rationalistic account of intentional action. I will try to defend that this form of practical rationalism can be avoided without renouncing the basic intuitions behind Moran’s use of the notion of endorsement. 2007 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730802003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.1 Vol.22 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_339730802003 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publisher | Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea |
| spellingShingle | Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action Josep L. PRADES Filosofía self reasons knowledge Intentional action practical reasoning Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action Josep L. PRADES Filosofía self reasons knowledge Intentional action practical reasoning In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional action presents a certain unresolved tension. On the one hand, the epistemic privilege of the first person derives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of the subject endorsing a course of action. An endorsing subject is not a mere observer of her intentions. On the other hand, the transparency of endorsement is assimilated to the putative fact that an agent forms her intentions by reflecting on the reasons to make up her mind. The resulting picture is an extremely rationalistic account of intentional action. I will try to defend that this form of practical rationalism can be avoided without renouncing the basic intuitions behind Moran’s use of the notion of endorsement. 2007 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730802003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.1 Vol.22 |
| title | Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action |
| topic | Filosofía self reasons knowledge Intentional action practical reasoning |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730802003 |