When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | en |
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Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2007
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| author | Hilan BENSUSAN |
| author_facet | Hilan BENSUSAN |
| contents | When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough Hilan BENSUSAN Manuel DE PINEDO Filosofía self knowledge Richard Moran Moore’s paradox Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of Moore-paradoxical cases to be meaningful. In this paper we reflect on the consequences of this view for the acquisition of beliefs, and argue that, as in the moral case, excessive concentration on a third-personal understanding of thought undermines the very idea of being directed to the world and of being capable to fully own our own beliefs. We suggest that maybe too much attention to epistemic virtues or to justification is misdirected and could produce beliefs that are themselves not first-personal enough. 2007 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730802004 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.1 Vol.22 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_339730802004 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publisher | Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea |
| spellingShingle | When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough Hilan BENSUSAN Filosofía self knowledge Richard Moran Moore’s paradox When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough Hilan BENSUSAN Manuel DE PINEDO Filosofía self knowledge Richard Moran Moore’s paradox Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of Moore-paradoxical cases to be meaningful. In this paper we reflect on the consequences of this view for the acquisition of beliefs, and argue that, as in the moral case, excessive concentration on a third-personal understanding of thought undermines the very idea of being directed to the world and of being capable to fully own our own beliefs. We suggest that maybe too much attention to epistemic virtues or to justification is misdirected and could produce beliefs that are themselves not first-personal enough. 2007 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730802004 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.1 Vol.22 |
| title | When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough |
| topic | Filosofía self knowledge Richard Moran Moore’s paradox |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730802004 |