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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Artículo científico |
| Lingua: | en |
| Pubblicazione: |
Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2007
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| Accesso online: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730803002 |
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Sommario:
- Conceptual schemes and empiricism: what Davidson saw and McDowell missed Jesús COLL MÁRMOL Filosofía Davidson McDowell empiricism appearings conceptual schemes This paper is an examination and evaluation of McDowell’s criticisms of Davidson’s views on conceptual schemes and empiricism. I will argue that McDowell does not understand the real nature of Davidson’s arguments against the scheme-content dualism and that his new empiricist proposal fails to solve all the problems that old empiricism has traditionally raised. This is so because Davidson does not try to reject only a certain conception of experience by rejecting the dualism of scheme and content, but a way of thinking about meaning and knowledge that assumes a dualism that cannot be maintained. 2007 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730803002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.2 Vol.22