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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | en |
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Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2008
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| Online Access: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730806001 |
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Table of Contents:
- Defending “Restricted Particularism” from Jackson, Pettit & Smith Dan LÓPEZ DE SA Filosofía values response dependence Particularism restricted particularism According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith (2000), “restricted particularism” is not affected by their superven- ience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a cen- tral role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this ob- jection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conver- sations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s (1989). 2008 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730806001 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.2 Vol.23