Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either)

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Main Author: Victor M. Verdejo
Format: Artículo científico
Language:en
Published: Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea 2009
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author Victor M. Verdejo
author_facet Victor M. Verdejo
contents Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either) Victor M. Verdejo Filosofía rationality semantic rule compositionality reverse compositionality Inferential Role Semantics Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to ac- commodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defend- er of IRS can still offer a satisfactory account in terms of the inferential capacities of rational thinkers. 2009 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730808002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.1 Vol.24
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_339730808002
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2009
publisher Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
spellingShingle Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either)
Victor M. Verdejo
Filosofía
rationality
semantic rule
compositionality
reverse compositionality
Inferential Role Semantics
Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either) Victor M. Verdejo Filosofía rationality semantic rule compositionality reverse compositionality Inferential Role Semantics Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to ac- commodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defend- er of IRS can still offer a satisfactory account in terms of the inferential capacities of rational thinkers. 2009 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730808002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.1 Vol.24
title Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either)
topic Filosofía
rationality
semantic rule
compositionality
reverse compositionality
Inferential Role Semantics
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730808002