Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery

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Autor principal: Michael DEVITT
Formato: Artículo científico
Lenguaje:en
Publicado: Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea 2012
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author Michael DEVITT
author_facet Michael DEVITT
contents Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery Michael DEVITT Filosofía bias corpus Methodology experiments linguistic usage Machery argues: (1) that “philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s —if anything, they are probably worse”; (2) that “intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference”. (1) lacks theoretical and empiri- cal support. (2) cannot be right because usage provides the evidence that intuitions are reliable. 2012 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730819008 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.2 Vol.27
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_339730819008
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2012
publisher Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
spellingShingle Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery
Michael DEVITT
Filosofía
bias
corpus
Methodology
experiments
linguistic usage
Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery Michael DEVITT Filosofía bias corpus Methodology experiments linguistic usage Machery argues: (1) that “philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s —if anything, they are probably worse”; (2) that “intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference”. (1) lacks theoretical and empiri- cal support. (2) cannot be right because usage provides the evidence that intuitions are reliable. 2012 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730819008 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.2 Vol.27
title Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery
topic Filosofía
bias
corpus
Methodology
experiments
linguistic usage
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730819008