The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions
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| Natura: | Artículo científico |
| Lingua: | en |
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Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2015
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| _version_ | 1876461029947342848 |
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| author | Jonah N. Schupbach |
| author_facet | Jonah N. Schupbach |
| contents | The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions Jonah N. Schupbach Filosofía Coherence Bayesianism Probability C onfirmation Impossibility Results n (Schupbach 2008), I put forward a “possibility res ult” for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there ex- ist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply tha t coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, Schubert (2012) argues that the specific ceteris paribus condit ions I consider are “jointly inconsistent”. In this article, I prove to the contrary that these conditions can cons istently be enforced while allowing degrees of co- herence to vary. Next, I consider a related criticism, inspired by Olsson’s (2005) constraints on ceteris paribus conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle (s) that should guide one in choosing appropri- ately stringent ceteris paribus conditions. 2015 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339741430004 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.1 Vol.30 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_339741430004 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea |
| spellingShingle | The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions Jonah N. Schupbach Filosofía Coherence Bayesianism Probability C onfirmation Impossibility Results The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions Jonah N. Schupbach Filosofía Coherence Bayesianism Probability C onfirmation Impossibility Results n (Schupbach 2008), I put forward a “possibility res ult” for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there ex- ist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply tha t coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, Schubert (2012) argues that the specific ceteris paribus condit ions I consider are “jointly inconsistent”. In this article, I prove to the contrary that these conditions can cons istently be enforced while allowing degrees of co- herence to vary. Next, I consider a related criticism, inspired by Olsson’s (2005) constraints on ceteris paribus conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle (s) that should guide one in choosing appropri- ately stringent ceteris paribus conditions. 2015 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339741430004 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.1 Vol.30 |
| title | The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions |
| topic | Filosofía Coherence Bayesianism Probability C onfirmation Impossibility Results |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339741430004 |