Non-Representational Mathematical Realism
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Langue: | en |
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Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2015
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| _version_ | 1876487468554911744 |
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| author | María José Frápolli |
| author_facet | María José Frápolli |
| contents | Non-Representational Mathematical Realism María José Frápolli Filosofía anti truth realism numbers existence This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince mathematical realists that they do not need to implement their perfectly sound and judicious intuitions with the anti-intuitive developments that render full-blown mathematical realism into a view which even Gödel considered objectionable (Gödel 1995, p. 150). I will argue for the following two theses: (i) that realism, in its standard characterization, is our default position, a position in agreement with our pre-theoretical intuitions and with the results of our best semantic theories, and (ii) that most of the metaphysical qualms usually related to it depends on a poor understanding of truth and existence as higher-order concepts. 2015 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339742547003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.3 Vol.30 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_339742547003 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea |
| spellingShingle | Non-Representational Mathematical Realism María José Frápolli Filosofía anti truth realism numbers existence Non-Representational Mathematical Realism María José Frápolli Filosofía anti truth realism numbers existence This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince mathematical realists that they do not need to implement their perfectly sound and judicious intuitions with the anti-intuitive developments that render full-blown mathematical realism into a view which even Gödel considered objectionable (Gödel 1995, p. 150). I will argue for the following two theses: (i) that realism, in its standard characterization, is our default position, a position in agreement with our pre-theoretical intuitions and with the results of our best semantic theories, and (ii) that most of the metaphysical qualms usually related to it depends on a poor understanding of truth and existence as higher-order concepts. 2015 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339742547003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.3 Vol.30 |
| title | Non-Representational Mathematical Realism |
| topic | Filosofía anti truth realism numbers existence |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339742547003 |