The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist
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| Formato: | Artículo científico |
| Lenguaje: | en |
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Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2015
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| _version_ | 1876447467068719104 |
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| author | Russell Marcus |
| author_facet | Russell Marcus |
| contents | The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist Russell Marcus Filosofía Mark Colyvan Eleatic principle autonomy platonism Indispensability argument The debate over whether we should believe that mathematical objects exist quickly leads to the question of how to determine what we should believe to exist. I ndispensabilists claim that we should believe in the existence of mathematical objects because of their ineliminable roles in scientific theory. Eleatics argue that only objects with causal properties exist. Mark Colyvan’s recent defenses of Quine’s indispensability argument present an intriguing attempt to provide reasons to favor the indispensabilist’s criterion against some contemporary eleatics. I show that Colyvan’s argument is not decisive against the eleatic and then sketch a way to capture some of the important intuitions behind both views. 2015 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339742547007 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.3 Vol.30 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_339742547007 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea |
| spellingShingle | The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist Russell Marcus Filosofía Mark Colyvan Eleatic principle autonomy platonism Indispensability argument The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist Russell Marcus Filosofía Mark Colyvan Eleatic principle autonomy platonism Indispensability argument The debate over whether we should believe that mathematical objects exist quickly leads to the question of how to determine what we should believe to exist. I ndispensabilists claim that we should believe in the existence of mathematical objects because of their ineliminable roles in scientific theory. Eleatics argue that only objects with causal properties exist. Mark Colyvan’s recent defenses of Quine’s indispensability argument present an intriguing attempt to provide reasons to favor the indispensabilist’s criterion against some contemporary eleatics. I show that Colyvan’s argument is not decisive against the eleatic and then sketch a way to capture some of the important intuitions behind both views. 2015 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339742547007 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.3 Vol.30 |
| title | The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist |
| topic | Filosofía Mark Colyvan Eleatic principle autonomy platonism Indispensability argument |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339742547007 |