Putnam’s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived

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Autor principal: Otávio Bueno
Formato: Artículo científico
Lenguaje:en
Publicado: Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea 2018
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author Otávio Bueno
author_facet Otávio Bueno
contents Putnam’s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived Otávio Bueno Filosofía Putnam Modalism Platonism Objectivity Indispensability  Crucial to Hilary Putnam’s realism in the philosophy of mathematics is to maintain the objectivity of mathematics without the commitment to the existence of mathematical objects. Putnam’s indispensability argument was devised as part of this conception. In this paper, I reconstruct and reassess Putnam’s argument for the indispensability of mathematics, and distinguish it from the more familiar, Quinean version of the argument. Although I argue that Putnam’s approach ultimately fails, I develop an alternative way of implementing his form of realism about mathematics that, by using different resources than those Putnam invokes, avoids the difficulties faced by his view. 2018 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339755528004 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/339755528004.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/movil https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18473 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.2 Vol.33
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_339755528004
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2018
publisher Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
spellingShingle Putnam’s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived
Otávio Bueno
Filosofía
Putnam
Modalism
Platonism
Objectivity
Indispensability
Putnam’s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived Otávio Bueno Filosofía Putnam Modalism Platonism Objectivity Indispensability  Crucial to Hilary Putnam’s realism in the philosophy of mathematics is to maintain the objectivity of mathematics without the commitment to the existence of mathematical objects. Putnam’s indispensability argument was devised as part of this conception. In this paper, I reconstruct and reassess Putnam’s argument for the indispensability of mathematics, and distinguish it from the more familiar, Quinean version of the argument. Although I argue that Putnam’s approach ultimately fails, I develop an alternative way of implementing his form of realism about mathematics that, by using different resources than those Putnam invokes, avoids the difficulties faced by his view. 2018 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339755528004 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/339755528004.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/movil https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18473 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.2 Vol.33
title Putnam’s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived
topic Filosofía
Putnam
Modalism
Platonism
Objectivity
Indispensability
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339755528004
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/html/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/339755528004.epub
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528004/movil
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18473