Indispensability, causation and explanation
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| Formato: | Artículo científico |
| Lenguaje: | en |
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Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2018
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| _version_ | 1876476696025104384 |
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| author | Sorin Bangu |
| author_facet | Sorin Bangu |
| contents | Indispensability, causation and explanation Sorin Bangu Filosofía Realism Causation Nominalism Explanation Indispensability When considering mathematical realism, some scientific realists reject it, and express sympathy for the opposite view, mathematical nominalism; moreover, many justify this option by invoking the causal inertness of mathematical objects. The main aim of this note is to show that the scientific realists’ endorsement of this causal mathematical nominalism is in tension with another position some (many?) of them also accept, the doctrine of methodological naturalism. By highlighting this conflict, I intend to tip the balance in favor of a rival of mathematical nominalism, the mathematical realist position supported by the ‘Indispensability Argument’ —but I do this indirectly, by showing that the road toward it is not blocked by considerations from causation. 2018 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339755528005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/339755528005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/movil https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17619 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.2 Vol.33 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_339755528005 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea |
| spellingShingle | Indispensability, causation and explanation Sorin Bangu Filosofía Realism Causation Nominalism Explanation Indispensability Indispensability, causation and explanation Sorin Bangu Filosofía Realism Causation Nominalism Explanation Indispensability When considering mathematical realism, some scientific realists reject it, and express sympathy for the opposite view, mathematical nominalism; moreover, many justify this option by invoking the causal inertness of mathematical objects. The main aim of this note is to show that the scientific realists’ endorsement of this causal mathematical nominalism is in tension with another position some (many?) of them also accept, the doctrine of methodological naturalism. By highlighting this conflict, I intend to tip the balance in favor of a rival of mathematical nominalism, the mathematical realist position supported by the ‘Indispensability Argument’ —but I do this indirectly, by showing that the road toward it is not blocked by considerations from causation. 2018 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339755528005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/339755528005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/movil https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17619 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.2 Vol.33 |
| title | Indispensability, causation and explanation |
| topic | Filosofía Realism Causation Nominalism Explanation Indispensability |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339755528005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/339755528005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3397/339755528005/movil https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17619 |