SOME APPARENT OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPING A KANTIAN VIRTUE THEORY
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| Formato: | Artículo científico |
| Lenguaje: | en |
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Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico
2010
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| _version_ | 1876489214390960128 |
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| author | AMY LARA |
| author_facet | AMY LARA |
| contents | SOME APPARENT OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPING A KANTIAN VIRTUE THEORY AMY LARA Filosofía Virtue theory John McDowell Kantian ethics Several neo-Kantians have questioned the standard deontological interpretation of Kant’s ethical theory. They have also responded to charges of rationalism and rigorism by emphasizing the role of virtues and emotions in Kant’s view. However, none have defended a fully virtue theoretic interpretation of Kant’s theory. I claim that virtue theory has much to offer Kantians, but that resistance to developing a Kantian virtue theory rests on faulty assumptions about virtue theory. In this paper I clear away three apparent obstacles to developing a Kantian virtue theory. The first regards his account of the virtues, which I argue is tangential to the issue of whether he can be interpreted as a virtue theorist. The second is Kant’s codification of moral principles, which I argue is compatible with virtue theory. The third is the apparent explanatory primacy of the Categorical Imperative, which I argue is not fully supported by the textual evidence. 2010 artículo científico 0326-1301 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340030302003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3400 Análisis Filosófico application/pdf Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico Análisis Filosófico (Argentina) Num.2 Vol.XXX |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_340030302003 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico |
| spellingShingle | SOME APPARENT OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPING A KANTIAN VIRTUE THEORY AMY LARA Filosofía Virtue theory John McDowell Kantian ethics SOME APPARENT OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPING A KANTIAN VIRTUE THEORY AMY LARA Filosofía Virtue theory John McDowell Kantian ethics Several neo-Kantians have questioned the standard deontological interpretation of Kant’s ethical theory. They have also responded to charges of rationalism and rigorism by emphasizing the role of virtues and emotions in Kant’s view. However, none have defended a fully virtue theoretic interpretation of Kant’s theory. I claim that virtue theory has much to offer Kantians, but that resistance to developing a Kantian virtue theory rests on faulty assumptions about virtue theory. In this paper I clear away three apparent obstacles to developing a Kantian virtue theory. The first regards his account of the virtues, which I argue is tangential to the issue of whether he can be interpreted as a virtue theorist. The second is Kant’s codification of moral principles, which I argue is compatible with virtue theory. The third is the apparent explanatory primacy of the Categorical Imperative, which I argue is not fully supported by the textual evidence. 2010 artículo científico 0326-1301 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340030302003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3400 Análisis Filosófico application/pdf Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico Análisis Filosófico (Argentina) Num.2 Vol.XXX |
| title | SOME APPARENT OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPING A KANTIAN VIRTUE THEORY |
| topic | Filosofía Virtue theory John McDowell Kantian ethics |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340030302003 |