Reasoning and Self-Knowledge
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | en |
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Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico
2018
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| author | Martin F. Fricke |
| author_facet | Martin F. Fricke |
| contents | Reasoning and Self-Knowledge Martin F. Fricke Filosofía Self Byrne Reasoning Knowledge Shoemaker What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker (1988), a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker (1988 and 2009) and Byrne (2005), claims that we can reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference (Boyle 2011) and that it makes us form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them (Gertler 2011). I sketch responses to both objections. 2018 artículo científico 0326-1301 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340060432004 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/340060432004.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/movil en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3400 Análisis Filosófico application/pdf Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico Análisis Filosófico (Argentina) Num.1 Vol.XXXVIII |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_340060432004 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico |
| spellingShingle | Reasoning and Self-Knowledge Martin F. Fricke Filosofía Self Byrne Reasoning Knowledge Shoemaker Reasoning and Self-Knowledge Martin F. Fricke Filosofía Self Byrne Reasoning Knowledge Shoemaker What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker (1988), a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker (1988 and 2009) and Byrne (2005), claims that we can reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference (Boyle 2011) and that it makes us form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them (Gertler 2011). I sketch responses to both objections. 2018 artículo científico 0326-1301 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340060432004 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/340060432004.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/movil en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3400 Análisis Filosófico application/pdf Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico Análisis Filosófico (Argentina) Num.1 Vol.XXXVIII |
| title | Reasoning and Self-Knowledge |
| topic | Filosofía Self Byrne Reasoning Knowledge Shoemaker |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340060432004 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/340060432004.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060432004/movil |