The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
Fuente:
Redalyc
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Sprache: | en |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho
2018
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1876468834491170816 |
|---|---|
| author | Alfredo Pereira |
| author_facet | Alfredo Pereira |
| contents | The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology Alfredo Pereira Filosofía Non Feeling Cognitive Projection Conceptual The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned. 2018 artículo científico 0101-3173 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=384272842011 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3842 Trans/Form/Ação application/pdf Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho Trans/Form/Ação (Brasil) Vol.41 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_384272842011 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho |
| spellingShingle | The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology Alfredo Pereira Filosofía Non Feeling Cognitive Projection Conceptual The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology Alfredo Pereira Filosofía Non Feeling Cognitive Projection Conceptual The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned. 2018 artículo científico 0101-3173 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=384272842011 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3842 Trans/Form/Ação application/pdf Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho Trans/Form/Ação (Brasil) Vol.41 |
| title | The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
| topic | Filosofía Non Feeling Cognitive Projection Conceptual |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=384272842011 |