HOW FAR CAN YOU GO WITH QUIETISM?
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| Natura: | Artículo científico |
| Lingua: | en |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2010
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| _version_ | 1876456162801483776 |
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| author | Gerald LANG |
| author_facet | Gerald LANG |
| contents | HOW FAR CAN YOU GO WITH QUIETISM? Gerald LANG Derecho Ronald Dworkin Quietism Metaethics Naturalism Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs renews and amplifies his earlier attacks on metaethics. This article reviews the main lineaments of Dworkin’s anti-metaethical arguments and discusses, in detail, a number of issues which arise from them. First, it is suggested that Dworkin’s appraisal of what is doing most of the explanatory work in his account is largely askew. Second, it is claimed that Dworkin’s allegation that expressivism is self-defeating is wide of the mark, but that another charge in the same vicinity might be more effective. Third, it is argued that Dworkin’s incuriosity about moral metaphysics is misplaced. What his arguments actually support is an opposition to leaving metaphysical hostages to fortune, rather than an opposition to pursuing greater clarification about moral metaphysics. In this connection, it is tentatively suggested that Dworkin might be tempted by a certain version of naturalism. 2010 artículo científico 2007-4387 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421940002001 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=4219 Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho application/pdf Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho (México) Num.4 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_421940002001 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México |
| spellingShingle | HOW FAR CAN YOU GO WITH QUIETISM? Gerald LANG Derecho Ronald Dworkin Quietism Metaethics Naturalism HOW FAR CAN YOU GO WITH QUIETISM? Gerald LANG Derecho Ronald Dworkin Quietism Metaethics Naturalism Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs renews and amplifies his earlier attacks on metaethics. This article reviews the main lineaments of Dworkin’s anti-metaethical arguments and discusses, in detail, a number of issues which arise from them. First, it is suggested that Dworkin’s appraisal of what is doing most of the explanatory work in his account is largely askew. Second, it is claimed that Dworkin’s allegation that expressivism is self-defeating is wide of the mark, but that another charge in the same vicinity might be more effective. Third, it is argued that Dworkin’s incuriosity about moral metaphysics is misplaced. What his arguments actually support is an opposition to leaving metaphysical hostages to fortune, rather than an opposition to pursuing greater clarification about moral metaphysics. In this connection, it is tentatively suggested that Dworkin might be tempted by a certain version of naturalism. 2010 artículo científico 2007-4387 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421940002001 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=4219 Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho application/pdf Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho (México) Num.4 |
| title | HOW FAR CAN YOU GO WITH QUIETISM? |
| topic | Derecho Ronald Dworkin Quietism Metaethics Naturalism |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421940002001 |