METAETHICS FOR EVERYONE
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | en |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2010
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| _version_ | 1876471933469458432 |
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| author | Andrew REISNER |
| author_facet | Andrew REISNER |
| contents | METAETHICS FOR EVERYONE Andrew REISNER Derecho Ronald Realism Dworkin Metaethics Scepticism As Dworkin puts it: moral scepticism is a moral view. This is in contrast to the more popular idea that the real challenge for moral realism is external scepticism, scepticism which arises because of non-moral considerations about the metaphysics of morality. I, too, do not concur with Dworkin’s strongest conclusions about the viability of external scepticism. But, I think his criticism of error scepticism offers a much needed corrective to more traditional metaethical projects. My aim in this paper is to split the difference between Dworkin’s view and more traditional views, concluding that Dworkin’s work in Justice for Hedgehogs contributes to metaethics for everyone. 2010 artículo científico 2007-4387 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421940002002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=4219 Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho application/pdf Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho (México) Num.4 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_421940002002 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México |
| spellingShingle | METAETHICS FOR EVERYONE Andrew REISNER Derecho Ronald Realism Dworkin Metaethics Scepticism METAETHICS FOR EVERYONE Andrew REISNER Derecho Ronald Realism Dworkin Metaethics Scepticism As Dworkin puts it: moral scepticism is a moral view. This is in contrast to the more popular idea that the real challenge for moral realism is external scepticism, scepticism which arises because of non-moral considerations about the metaphysics of morality. I, too, do not concur with Dworkin’s strongest conclusions about the viability of external scepticism. But, I think his criticism of error scepticism offers a much needed corrective to more traditional metaethical projects. My aim in this paper is to split the difference between Dworkin’s view and more traditional views, concluding that Dworkin’s work in Justice for Hedgehogs contributes to metaethics for everyone. 2010 artículo científico 2007-4387 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421940002002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=4219 Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho application/pdf Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho (México) Num.4 |
| title | METAETHICS FOR EVERYONE |
| topic | Derecho Ronald Realism Dworkin Metaethics Scepticism |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421940002002 |