Optimal Reciprocal Dumping in a Managed Trade Regime
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | en |
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Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas A.C.
2019
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| _version_ | 1876430819972612096 |
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| author | Alberto Gallegos David |
| author_facet | Alberto Gallegos David |
| contents | Optimal Reciprocal Dumping in a Managed Trade Regime Alberto Gallegos David Economía y Finanzas Managed trade Reciprocal Dumping Cournot competition The purpose of this article is to examine the strategic relationship between trade policy in a managed protection regime and commercial exchange at prices below normal value. It presents a three-stage model of imperfect competition that incorporates the possibility for the government authority to influence the production decisions of companies through a credible threat, by means of a specific tariff. This methodology-in a context of segmented markets, Cournot conjectures, and the application of an optimal tariff-generates a mechanism of incentives (which are not sufficient from a social welfare perspective) for domestic and foreign companies to practice reciprocal dumping. A general conclusion is that a free trade policy would be counterproductive, since it would eliminate the incentives that domestic and foreign companies would have to carry out the commercial exchange that would diminish the loss of welfare associated with the existence of monopolies in both markets. JEL Classification: F12 2019 artículo científico 1665-5346 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=423759823005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/423759823005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/movil 10.21919/remef.v14i2.309 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=4237 Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas. Nueva Época / Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance application/pdf Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas A.C. Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas. Nueva Época / Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance (México) Num.2 Vol.14 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_423759823005 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publisher | Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas A.C. |
| spellingShingle | Optimal Reciprocal Dumping in a Managed Trade Regime Alberto Gallegos David Economía y Finanzas Managed trade Reciprocal Dumping Cournot competition Optimal Reciprocal Dumping in a Managed Trade Regime Alberto Gallegos David Economía y Finanzas Managed trade Reciprocal Dumping Cournot competition The purpose of this article is to examine the strategic relationship between trade policy in a managed protection regime and commercial exchange at prices below normal value. It presents a three-stage model of imperfect competition that incorporates the possibility for the government authority to influence the production decisions of companies through a credible threat, by means of a specific tariff. This methodology-in a context of segmented markets, Cournot conjectures, and the application of an optimal tariff-generates a mechanism of incentives (which are not sufficient from a social welfare perspective) for domestic and foreign companies to practice reciprocal dumping. A general conclusion is that a free trade policy would be counterproductive, since it would eliminate the incentives that domestic and foreign companies would have to carry out the commercial exchange that would diminish the loss of welfare associated with the existence of monopolies in both markets. JEL Classification: F12 2019 artículo científico 1665-5346 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=423759823005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/423759823005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/movil 10.21919/remef.v14i2.309 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=4237 Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas. Nueva Época / Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance application/pdf Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas A.C. Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas. Nueva Época / Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance (México) Num.2 Vol.14 |
| title | Optimal Reciprocal Dumping in a Managed Trade Regime |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas Managed trade Reciprocal Dumping Cournot competition |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=423759823005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/423759823005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4237/423759823005/movil |