Epistemic feelings in moral experiences and moral dynamics of everyday life

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Autore principale: Sylvia Terpe
Natura: Artículo científico
Lingua:en
Pubblicazione: Universitat Oberta de Catalunya 2016
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author Sylvia Terpe
author_facet Sylvia Terpe
contents Epistemic feelings in moral experiences and moral dynamics of everyday life Sylvia Terpe Estudios Culturales moral dynamics moral experiences Epistemic feelings The philosophy of emotions has identified a class of affective phenomena called epistemic feelings (e.g. certainty, doubt, or surprise). Such feelings are thought to inform about the quality of one’s knowledge and beliefs and to influence processes of knowledge acquisition and belief formation (1). I shall argue that these feelings also inform about the quality of one’s (moral) emotions and hence are important to understand everyday moral experiences and the moral dynamics resulting from them. The works of Hans Joas are a good starting point to substantiate this argument, because he relates, albeit implicitly, some epistemic feelings to particular moral experiences (2). Inspired by this analysis of Joas, I differentiate between three ideal typical moral dynamics (moral elaboration, moral relativization and moral closure), which can be induced by specific moral experiences (3). The empirical study of epistemic feelings presents some challenges (4). But such an endeavour promises to increase our understanding of processes of moral reproduction and transformation, and of the development of phenomena like moral dogmatism, moral opportunism, and moral scepticism (5). 2016 artículo científico 1575-2275 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=55045670003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=550 Digithum application/pdf Universitat Oberta de Catalunya Digithum (España) Num.18
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_55045670003
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2016
publisher Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
spellingShingle Epistemic feelings in moral experiences and moral dynamics of everyday life
Sylvia Terpe
Estudios Culturales
moral dynamics
moral experiences
Epistemic feelings
Epistemic feelings in moral experiences and moral dynamics of everyday life Sylvia Terpe Estudios Culturales moral dynamics moral experiences Epistemic feelings The philosophy of emotions has identified a class of affective phenomena called epistemic feelings (e.g. certainty, doubt, or surprise). Such feelings are thought to inform about the quality of one’s knowledge and beliefs and to influence processes of knowledge acquisition and belief formation (1). I shall argue that these feelings also inform about the quality of one’s (moral) emotions and hence are important to understand everyday moral experiences and the moral dynamics resulting from them. The works of Hans Joas are a good starting point to substantiate this argument, because he relates, albeit implicitly, some epistemic feelings to particular moral experiences (2). Inspired by this analysis of Joas, I differentiate between three ideal typical moral dynamics (moral elaboration, moral relativization and moral closure), which can be induced by specific moral experiences (3). The empirical study of epistemic feelings presents some challenges (4). But such an endeavour promises to increase our understanding of processes of moral reproduction and transformation, and of the development of phenomena like moral dogmatism, moral opportunism, and moral scepticism (5). 2016 artículo científico 1575-2275 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=55045670003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=550 Digithum application/pdf Universitat Oberta de Catalunya Digithum (España) Num.18
title Epistemic feelings in moral experiences and moral dynamics of everyday life
topic Estudios Culturales
moral dynamics
moral experiences
Epistemic feelings
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=55045670003