Campaign contributions and local Public goods in a federation

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Auteur principal: Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
Format: Artículo científico
Langue:en
Publié: El Colegio de México, A.C. 2018
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author Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
author_facet Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
contents Campaign contributions and local Public goods in a federation Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez Economía y Finanzas efficiency federalism externalities Local public goods elections and campaign contributions I develop a voting model of decentralized provision of local public goods (LPGs) with campaign contributions. I compare an economy with and without campaign contributions: in the former economy, local governments do not provide Pareto efficient LPGs and do not maximize the welfare gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences of voters. For the economy with campaign contributions, LPGs with and without spillovers are Pareto efficient, and the system of local governments maximizes the gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences. 2018 artículo científico 0188-6916 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=59760150004 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/59760150004.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/movil en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=597 Estudios Económicos application/pdf El Colegio de México, A.C. Estudios Económicos (México) Num.2 Vol.33
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_59760150004
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2018
publisher El Colegio de México, A.C.
spellingShingle Campaign contributions and local Public goods in a federation
Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
Economía y Finanzas
efficiency
federalism
externalities
Local public goods
elections and campaign contributions
Campaign contributions and local Public goods in a federation Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez Economía y Finanzas efficiency federalism externalities Local public goods elections and campaign contributions I develop a voting model of decentralized provision of local public goods (LPGs) with campaign contributions. I compare an economy with and without campaign contributions: in the former economy, local governments do not provide Pareto efficient LPGs and do not maximize the welfare gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences of voters. For the economy with campaign contributions, LPGs with and without spillovers are Pareto efficient, and the system of local governments maximizes the gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences. 2018 artículo científico 0188-6916 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=59760150004 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/59760150004.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/movil en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=597 Estudios Económicos application/pdf El Colegio de México, A.C. Estudios Económicos (México) Num.2 Vol.33
title Campaign contributions and local Public goods in a federation
topic Economía y Finanzas
efficiency
federalism
externalities
Local public goods
elections and campaign contributions
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=59760150004
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/html/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/59760150004.epub
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59760150004/movil