A NOTE ON FAIR THREATS AND PROMISES
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Langue: | en |
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El Colegio de México, A.C.
2022
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| _version_ | 1876459044757045248 |
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| author | Alejandro Tatsuo Moreno-Okuno |
| author_facet | Alejandro Tatsuo Moreno-Okuno |
| contents | A NOTE ON FAIR THREATS AND PROMISES Alejandro Tatsuo Moreno-Okuno Economía y Finanzas threats promises Reciprocity With their Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) developed a solution concept that incorporates reciprocity in sequential games. A SRE evaluates the kindness or unkindness of a strategy based purely on the actions it prescribes at the equilibrium path. However, given that it is not the objective of the SRE to evaluate threats and promises, it does not consider the actions outside the equilibrium path, where threats and promises are included. This article develops a new solution concept, Fair Threat Equilibria, which main objective is to give more reasonable predictions when threats and promises are included. 2022 artículo científico 0188-6916 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=59771283005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/59771283005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/movil 10.24201/ee.v37i1.429 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=597 Estudios Económicos application/pdf El Colegio de México, A.C. Estudios Económicos (México) Num.1 Vol.37 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_59771283005 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | El Colegio de México, A.C. |
| spellingShingle | A NOTE ON FAIR THREATS AND PROMISES Alejandro Tatsuo Moreno-Okuno Economía y Finanzas threats promises Reciprocity A NOTE ON FAIR THREATS AND PROMISES Alejandro Tatsuo Moreno-Okuno Economía y Finanzas threats promises Reciprocity With their Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) developed a solution concept that incorporates reciprocity in sequential games. A SRE evaluates the kindness or unkindness of a strategy based purely on the actions it prescribes at the equilibrium path. However, given that it is not the objective of the SRE to evaluate threats and promises, it does not consider the actions outside the equilibrium path, where threats and promises are included. This article develops a new solution concept, Fair Threat Equilibria, which main objective is to give more reasonable predictions when threats and promises are included. 2022 artículo científico 0188-6916 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=59771283005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/59771283005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/movil 10.24201/ee.v37i1.429 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=597 Estudios Económicos application/pdf El Colegio de México, A.C. Estudios Económicos (México) Num.1 Vol.37 |
| title | A NOTE ON FAIR THREATS AND PROMISES |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas threats promises Reciprocity |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=59771283005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/59771283005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/597/59771283005/movil |