The Debate About Aspect Perception Content

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Auteur principal: Maria Sol Yuan
Format: Artículo científico
Langue:en
Publié: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná 2024
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author Maria Sol Yuan
author_facet Maria Sol Yuan
contents The Debate About Aspect Perception Content Maria Sol Yuan Filosofía Non Wittgenstein Conceptualism conceptualism Aspect Perception In this paper, I analyse the discussion about perceptual conceptualism and non-conceptualism transferred to the phenomena of aspect perceptions presented by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Part titled “Philosophy of Psychology” ofPhilosophical Investigations. In doing so, I will reconstruct these positions by collecting some of the main theses of those who have taken a position in the contest. I will focus on the contributions of Sonia Sedivy and Charles Travis on behalf of conceptualism and the non-conceptualist defence of Avner Baz about aspects of these phenomena. As a result, the examination calls into question the terms of the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism. In this sense, the primary purpose of this research is negative since I will limit myself to sustain that neither of the presented positions is an adequate characterisation of the content of Wittgensteinian aspect perception. 2024 artículo científico 2965-1557 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=673377571010 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/673377571010.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/movil 10.1590/2965-1557.036.e202430925 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=6733 Revista de Filosofía Aurora application/pdf Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná Revista de Filosofía Aurora (Brasil) Vol.36
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_673377571010
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2024
publisher Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná
spellingShingle The Debate About Aspect Perception Content
Maria Sol Yuan
Filosofía
Non
Wittgenstein
Conceptualism
conceptualism
Aspect Perception
The Debate About Aspect Perception Content Maria Sol Yuan Filosofía Non Wittgenstein Conceptualism conceptualism Aspect Perception In this paper, I analyse the discussion about perceptual conceptualism and non-conceptualism transferred to the phenomena of aspect perceptions presented by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Part titled “Philosophy of Psychology” ofPhilosophical Investigations. In doing so, I will reconstruct these positions by collecting some of the main theses of those who have taken a position in the contest. I will focus on the contributions of Sonia Sedivy and Charles Travis on behalf of conceptualism and the non-conceptualist defence of Avner Baz about aspects of these phenomena. As a result, the examination calls into question the terms of the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism. In this sense, the primary purpose of this research is negative since I will limit myself to sustain that neither of the presented positions is an adequate characterisation of the content of Wittgensteinian aspect perception. 2024 artículo científico 2965-1557 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=673377571010 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/673377571010.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/movil 10.1590/2965-1557.036.e202430925 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=6733 Revista de Filosofía Aurora application/pdf Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná Revista de Filosofía Aurora (Brasil) Vol.36
title The Debate About Aspect Perception Content
topic Filosofía
Non
Wittgenstein
Conceptualism
conceptualism
Aspect Perception
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=673377571010
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/html/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/673377571010.epub
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571010/movil