THE MYTH OF CONCEPT PUBLICITY

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Main Author: LAURA DUHAU GIROLA
Format: Artículo científico
Language:es
Published: Universidad Nacional de Colombia 2012
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author LAURA DUHAU GIROLA
author_facet LAURA DUHAU GIROLA
contents THE MYTH OF CONCEPT PUBLICITY LAURA DUHAU GIROLA Filosofía Frege concepts publicity constraint concept individuation In this paper I defend the claim that concepts are not public. I argue that two of the main constraints for theories of concepts, namely (1) that concepts are public and (2) that they serve to explain Frege Cases, are in tension. (1) requires concepts to be individuated coarsely, while (2) requires concepts to be individuated finely. Thus, no theory of concepts can accommodate both (1) and (2). I argue that (2) is a non-negotiable constraint for theories of concepts, while (1) is negotiable. Therefore, theories of concepts should individuate concepts finely enough to solve Frege Cases, and claim that concepts are not public. 2012 artículo científico 0120-0062 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=80924112006 es http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=809 Ideas y Valores application/pdf Universidad Nacional de Colombia Ideas y Valores (Colombia) Num.148 Vol.LXI
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_80924112006
institution Redalyc
language es
publishDate 2012
publisher Universidad Nacional de Colombia
spellingShingle THE MYTH OF CONCEPT PUBLICITY
LAURA DUHAU GIROLA
Filosofía
Frege
concepts
publicity constraint
concept individuation
THE MYTH OF CONCEPT PUBLICITY LAURA DUHAU GIROLA Filosofía Frege concepts publicity constraint concept individuation In this paper I defend the claim that concepts are not public. I argue that two of the main constraints for theories of concepts, namely (1) that concepts are public and (2) that they serve to explain Frege Cases, are in tension. (1) requires concepts to be individuated coarsely, while (2) requires concepts to be individuated finely. Thus, no theory of concepts can accommodate both (1) and (2). I argue that (2) is a non-negotiable constraint for theories of concepts, while (1) is negotiable. Therefore, theories of concepts should individuate concepts finely enough to solve Frege Cases, and claim that concepts are not public. 2012 artículo científico 0120-0062 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=80924112006 es http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=809 Ideas y Valores application/pdf Universidad Nacional de Colombia Ideas y Valores (Colombia) Num.148 Vol.LXI
title THE MYTH OF CONCEPT PUBLICITY
topic Filosofía
Frege
concepts
publicity constraint
concept individuation
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=80924112006