The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
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| Formato: | Artículo científico |
| Lenguaje: | en |
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Universidad Alberto Hurtado
2011
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| _version_ | 1876483174787186688 |
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| author | Arijit Mukherjee |
| author_facet | Arijit Mukherjee |
| contents | The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament Arijit Mukherjee Leonard F.S. Wang Ingeniería excessive entry R & D tournament insufficient entry In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy. 2011 artículo científico 0718-2724 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=84721487006 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=847 Journal of Technology Management & Innovation application/pdf Universidad Alberto Hurtado Journal of Technology Management & Innovation (Chile) Num.4 Vol.6 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_84721487006 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Universidad Alberto Hurtado |
| spellingShingle | The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament Arijit Mukherjee Ingeniería excessive entry R & D tournament insufficient entry The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament Arijit Mukherjee Leonard F.S. Wang Ingeniería excessive entry R & D tournament insufficient entry In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy. 2011 artículo científico 0718-2724 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=84721487006 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=847 Journal of Technology Management & Innovation application/pdf Universidad Alberto Hurtado Journal of Technology Management & Innovation (Chile) Num.4 Vol.6 |
| title | The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament |
| topic | Ingeniería excessive entry R & D tournament insufficient entry |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=84721487006 |