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| Auteur principal: | |
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Langue: | en |
| Publié: |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado
2011
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| Accès en ligne: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=84721487006 |
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Table des matières:
- The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament Arijit Mukherjee Leonard F.S. Wang Ingeniería excessive entry R & D tournament insufficient entry In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy. 2011 artículo científico 0718-2724 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=84721487006 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=847 Journal of Technology Management & Innovation application/pdf Universidad Alberto Hurtado Journal of Technology Management & Innovation (Chile) Num.4 Vol.6