The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | en |
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Universidad del Norte
2011
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| _version_ | 1876484898498281472 |
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| author | Triantafyllos Gkouvas |
| author_facet | Triantafyllos Gkouvas |
| contents | The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation Triantafyllos Gkouvas Filosofía will autonomy pure reason moral judgment Moral motivation The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant's espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason's relation to the will is premised on a practical synthetic a priori proposition. What I aim to demonstrate is that Kant treated practical syntheticity as a pivotal concept for his account of what it means to be motivated by principles of pure reason. On my construal of Kant's motivational theory, the relation between universalizable maxims and the moral interest to act upon them is necessary but non-tautological, since violations of duty are logically possible despite our having a moral reason to act. What prevents the latter argument from collapsing into a quasiexternalist account of moral motivation is that the motivational impact of law-like maxims is ultimately premised on a normative conception of ourselves as free agents. 2011 artículo científico 1692-8857 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=85422476007 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=854 Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad del Norte application/pdf Universidad del Norte Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad del Norte (Colombia) Num.14 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_85422476007 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Universidad del Norte |
| spellingShingle | The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation Triantafyllos Gkouvas Filosofía will autonomy pure reason moral judgment Moral motivation The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation Triantafyllos Gkouvas Filosofía will autonomy pure reason moral judgment Moral motivation The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant's espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason's relation to the will is premised on a practical synthetic a priori proposition. What I aim to demonstrate is that Kant treated practical syntheticity as a pivotal concept for his account of what it means to be motivated by principles of pure reason. On my construal of Kant's motivational theory, the relation between universalizable maxims and the moral interest to act upon them is necessary but non-tautological, since violations of duty are logically possible despite our having a moral reason to act. What prevents the latter argument from collapsing into a quasiexternalist account of moral motivation is that the motivational impact of law-like maxims is ultimately premised on a normative conception of ourselves as free agents. 2011 artículo científico 1692-8857 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=85422476007 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=854 Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad del Norte application/pdf Universidad del Norte Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad del Norte (Colombia) Num.14 |
| title | The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation |
| topic | Filosofía will autonomy pure reason moral judgment Moral motivation |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=85422476007 |