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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Artículo Open Access |
| Pubblicazione: |
Wiley
2026
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bdm.70077 |
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Sommario:
- Warning: Warnings Can Backfire Even When They Provide New and Important Information Ido Erev Efrat Aharonov Majar Michael Sobolev Yefim Roth Journal of Behavioral Decision Making ABSTRACT We clarify the conditions under which warnings that provide useful information backfire. Our analysis is based on three observations: (1) warnings can increase the attention given to the warned‐against behavior, (2) in many settings, counterproductive warned‐against behaviors (like texting while driving) are typically rewarding, and (3) decisions from experience reflect insufficient sensitivity to rare outcomes. A simple model that abstracts the implications of these observations predicts that a backfiring effect initially emerges when the warned‐against behavior is unlikely to be considered without the warning. In addition, the model predicts an increase in the choice rate of the warned‐against behavior, with experience, when the probability of losing from the warned‐against behavior is low. Experiment 1 tests and supports these predictions in the context of warnings concerning risky clicks. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate the generality of these predictions in more complex settings that involve warnings concerning danger zones and misinformation. 10.1002/bdm.70077 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/