Nonparametric Identification of Incomplete Information Discrete Games With Non‐Equilibrium Behaviors

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Autore principale: Erhao Xie
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Pubblicazione: Wiley 2026
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author Erhao Xie
author_facet Erhao Xie
Erhao Xie
collection Wiley Open Access
contents Nonparametric Identification of Incomplete Information Discrete Games With Non‐Equilibrium Behaviors Erhao Xie Journal of Applied Econometrics ABSTRACT This paper studies empirical discrete‐choice games with incomplete information under nonparametric specifications of both the payoff function and the distribution of private information. It relaxes the standard global equilibrium assumption —under which players follow equilibrium strategies for all realizations of the control variables—and introduces a weaker local equilibrium assumption that requires the equilibrium restriction only for some, but not all, realizations. Under this maintained assumption and standard exclusion restrictions, I derive the testable implications of the global equilibrium hypothesis and establish the nonparametric identification of all unknown functions in the model. This paper also discusses settings where the local equilibrium condition applies. The method is illustrated through a Monte Carlo experiment and an empirical application examining the competition between KFC and McDonald's in China. The estimation results strongly reject the global equilibrium assumption. 10.1002/jae.70021 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor
doi_str_mv 10.1002/jae.70021
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id wiley_oa_10_1002_jae_70021
institution Wiley Open Access
license_str_mv http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor
publishDate 2026
publisher Wiley
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spellingShingle Nonparametric Identification of Incomplete Information Discrete Games With Non‐Equilibrium Behaviors
Erhao Xie
Journal of Applied Econometrics
Nonparametric Identification of Incomplete Information Discrete Games With Non‐Equilibrium Behaviors Erhao Xie Journal of Applied Econometrics ABSTRACT This paper studies empirical discrete‐choice games with incomplete information under nonparametric specifications of both the payoff function and the distribution of private information. It relaxes the standard global equilibrium assumption —under which players follow equilibrium strategies for all realizations of the control variables—and introduces a weaker local equilibrium assumption that requires the equilibrium restriction only for some, but not all, realizations. Under this maintained assumption and standard exclusion restrictions, I derive the testable implications of the global equilibrium hypothesis and establish the nonparametric identification of all unknown functions in the model. This paper also discusses settings where the local equilibrium condition applies. The method is illustrated through a Monte Carlo experiment and an empirical application examining the competition between KFC and McDonald's in China. The estimation results strongly reject the global equilibrium assumption. 10.1002/jae.70021 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor
title Nonparametric Identification of Incomplete Information Discrete Games With Non‐Equilibrium Behaviors
topic Journal of Applied Econometrics
url https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jae.70021