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| Format: | Artículo Open Access |
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Wiley
2024
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| Online-Zugang: | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.70001 |
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- Apply the Laws, if They are Good: Moral Evaluations Linearly Predict Whether Judges Should Enforce the Law Neele Engelmann Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de Almeida Felipe Oliveira de Sousa Karolina Prochownik Ivar R. Hannikainen Noel Struchiner Stefan Magen Cognitive Science AbstractWhat should judges do when faced with immoral laws? Should they apply them without exception, since “the law is the law?” Or can exceptions be made for grossly immoral laws, such as historically, Nazi law? Surveying laypeople (N = 167) and people with some legal training (N = 141) on these matters, we find a surprisingly strong, monotonic relationship between people's subjective moral evaluation of laws and their judgments that these laws should be applied in concrete cases. This tendency is most pronounced among individuals who endorse natural law (i.e., the legal‐philosophical view that immoral laws are not valid laws at all), and is attenuated when disagreement about the moral status of a law is considered reasonable. The relationship is equally strong for laypeople and for those with legal training. We situate our findings within the broader context of morality's influence on legal reasoning that experimental jurisprudence has uncovered in recent years, and consider normative implications. 10.1111/cogs.70001 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/