Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Artículo Open Access |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Wiley
2024
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fire.12413 |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1867020381689217024 |
|---|---|
| author | Hongrui Feng Yanhuang Huang Betty Simkins Jian Wang |
| author_facet | Hongrui Feng Yanhuang Huang Betty Simkins Jian Wang Hongrui Feng Yanhuang Huang Betty Simkins Jian Wang |
| collection | Wiley Open Access |
| contents | Manager political preferences and company investor bases Hongrui Feng Yanhuang Huang Betty Simkins Jian Wang Financial Review AbstractWe investigate how the personal political preferences of top managers shape the investor base of firms. Based on the risk‐aversion attitude of firm decisions that rely on conservative political ideologies, we find that Republican managers tend to maintain a lower leverage level; invest less in tangible assets and R&D to pursue near‐term profitability; and maintain a high quality of information disclosure to increase stock liquidity. We demonstrate that firms led by Republican managers can attract more transient institutions. This relationship becomes stronger during financially stressful periods and is robust after considering the moderating role of managerial discretion and potential endogeneity. 10.1111/fire.12413 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/fire.12413 |
| format | Artículo Open Access |
| id | wiley_oa_10_1111_fire_12413 |
| institution | Wiley Open Access |
| license_str_mv | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | wiley_oa |
| spellingShingle | Manager political preferences and company investor bases Hongrui Feng Yanhuang Huang Betty Simkins Jian Wang Financial Review Manager political preferences and company investor bases Hongrui Feng Yanhuang Huang Betty Simkins Jian Wang Financial Review AbstractWe investigate how the personal political preferences of top managers shape the investor base of firms. Based on the risk‐aversion attitude of firm decisions that rely on conservative political ideologies, we find that Republican managers tend to maintain a lower leverage level; invest less in tangible assets and R&D to pursue near‐term profitability; and maintain a high quality of information disclosure to increase stock liquidity. We demonstrate that firms led by Republican managers can attract more transient institutions. This relationship becomes stronger during financially stressful periods and is robust after considering the moderating role of managerial discretion and potential endogeneity. 10.1111/fire.12413 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| title | Manager political preferences and company investor bases |
| topic | Financial Review |
| url | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fire.12413 |