Divisional Managers and Corporate Disclosure Quality
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Wiley Open Access
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| Format: | Artículo Open Access |
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Wiley
2025
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| _version_ | 1867002298754924544 |
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| author | Zhaoran (Jason) Gong Lixin (Nancy) Su Fujing Xue Cheng (Colin) Zeng |
| author_facet | Zhaoran (Jason) Gong Lixin (Nancy) Su Fujing Xue Cheng (Colin) Zeng Zhaoran (Jason) Gong Lixin (Nancy) Su Fujing Xue Cheng (Colin) Zeng |
| collection | Wiley Open Access |
| contents | Divisional Managers and Corporate Disclosure Quality Zhaoran (Jason) Gong Lixin (Nancy) Su Fujing Xue Cheng (Colin) Zeng Journal of Business Finance & Accounting ABSTRACT Using a large sample of US firms, we study the role of divisional managers in corporate disclosure quality. We find that when a company's divisional managers have previously worked with the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief financial officer (CFO) at other companies, in other words, they have co‐working experience, the company produces more accurate management earnings forecasts, experiences lower future stock price crash risks, and engages in less accrual‐based earnings management, consistent with the notion that co‐working experience facilitates internal communication, which, in turn, improves external disclosure quality. Moreover, the information‐enhancing role of the co‐working experience is more pronounced for firms with greater organizational complexity, more opaque internal information environments, and CEOs or CFOs who are relatively new to their positions. Overall, our results provide new insight into the role of divisional managers in shaping corporate disclosure and transparency. 10.1111/jbfa.70013 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/jbfa.70013 |
| format | Artículo Open Access |
| id | wiley_oa_10_1111_jbfa_70013 |
| institution | Wiley Open Access |
| license_str_mv | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | wiley_oa |
| spellingShingle | Divisional Managers and Corporate Disclosure Quality Zhaoran (Jason) Gong Lixin (Nancy) Su Fujing Xue Cheng (Colin) Zeng Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Divisional Managers and Corporate Disclosure Quality Zhaoran (Jason) Gong Lixin (Nancy) Su Fujing Xue Cheng (Colin) Zeng Journal of Business Finance & Accounting ABSTRACT Using a large sample of US firms, we study the role of divisional managers in corporate disclosure quality. We find that when a company's divisional managers have previously worked with the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief financial officer (CFO) at other companies, in other words, they have co‐working experience, the company produces more accurate management earnings forecasts, experiences lower future stock price crash risks, and engages in less accrual‐based earnings management, consistent with the notion that co‐working experience facilitates internal communication, which, in turn, improves external disclosure quality. Moreover, the information‐enhancing role of the co‐working experience is more pronounced for firms with greater organizational complexity, more opaque internal information environments, and CEOs or CFOs who are relatively new to their positions. Overall, our results provide new insight into the role of divisional managers in shaping corporate disclosure and transparency. 10.1111/jbfa.70013 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| title | Divisional Managers and Corporate Disclosure Quality |
| topic | Journal of Business Finance & Accounting |
| url | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jbfa.70013 |