Foreclosure and Profit Shifting With Partial Vertical Ownership
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Wiley Open Access
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| Natura: | Artículo Open Access |
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Wiley
2024
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| _version_ | 1867004748752748544 |
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| author | Matthias Hunold Vasilisa Werner |
| author_facet | Matthias Hunold Vasilisa Werner Matthias Hunold Vasilisa Werner |
| collection | Wiley Open Access |
| contents | Foreclosure and Profit Shifting With Partial Vertical Ownership Matthias Hunold Vasilisa Werner Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ABSTRACTWe demonstrate that the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profit from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but may have significant influence over the target's strategy. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction. 10.1111/jems.12621 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/jems.12621 |
| format | Artículo Open Access |
| id | wiley_oa_10_1111_jems_12621 |
| institution | Wiley Open Access |
| license_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | wiley_oa |
| spellingShingle | Foreclosure and Profit Shifting With Partial Vertical Ownership Matthias Hunold Vasilisa Werner Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Foreclosure and Profit Shifting With Partial Vertical Ownership Matthias Hunold Vasilisa Werner Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ABSTRACTWe demonstrate that the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profit from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but may have significant influence over the target's strategy. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction. 10.1111/jems.12621 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| title | Foreclosure and Profit Shifting With Partial Vertical Ownership |
| topic | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy |
| url | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jems.12621 |