The conditional value of autonomy
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Wiley Open Access
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| Natura: | Artículo Open Access |
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Wiley
2025
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| _version_ | 1867002928969023488 |
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| author | Victor Tadros |
| author_facet | Victor Tadros Victor Tadros |
| collection | Wiley Open Access |
| contents | The conditional value of autonomy Victor Tadros Philosophy and Phenomenological Research AbstractThis paper is concerned with the conditional value of autonomy. It is valuable for a person to have acted autonomously, but only conditionally on the act performed. It is good for a person autonomously to pursue a noble deed, for example, and bad for a person autonomously to kill without justification. This paper rejects two familiar views of the conditional value of autonomy – that it is always worse for a person to autonomously do what is wrong; and that it is always better for a person autonomously to comply with duty. In doing so, it clarifies the fact that value can play different roles in personal axiology and in deontology. 10.1111/phpr.70023 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/phpr.70023 |
| format | Artículo Open Access |
| id | wiley_oa_10_1111_phpr_70023 |
| institution | Wiley Open Access |
| license_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | wiley_oa |
| spellingShingle | The conditional value of autonomy Victor Tadros Philosophy and Phenomenological Research The conditional value of autonomy Victor Tadros Philosophy and Phenomenological Research AbstractThis paper is concerned with the conditional value of autonomy. It is valuable for a person to have acted autonomously, but only conditionally on the act performed. It is good for a person autonomously to pursue a noble deed, for example, and bad for a person autonomously to kill without justification. This paper rejects two familiar views of the conditional value of autonomy – that it is always worse for a person to autonomously do what is wrong; and that it is always better for a person autonomously to comply with duty. In doing so, it clarifies the fact that value can play different roles in personal axiology and in deontology. 10.1111/phpr.70023 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| title | The conditional value of autonomy |
| topic | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| url | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.70023 |