The Gradability of ‘Conscious’
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Wiley Open Access
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| Natura: | Artículo Open Access |
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Wiley
2026
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| author | Andrew Y. Lee Poppy Mankowitz |
| author_facet | Andrew Y. Lee Poppy Mankowitz Andrew Y. Lee Poppy Mankowitz |
| collection | Wiley Open Access |
| contents | The Gradability of ‘Conscious’ Andrew Y. Lee Poppy Mankowitz Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ABSTRACT Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a gradable adjective , meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more f than,” “slightly f ,” etc.) and that is associated with a degreed property. Both sides face an explanatory burden: they must explain why some competent speakers seem confused about the meaning of “conscious.” We argue that the question does make sense: “conscious” sometimes functions as a minimal‐standard gradable adjective. But we will also explain why some theorists have been skeptical about gradable uses of “conscious.” Along the way, we address the objection that many gradable constructions involving “what it's like” expressions are infelicitous, distinguish two interpretations of “phenomenal consciousness,” and discuss how our semantic arguments bear on the metaphysical question of whether consciousness comes in degrees. 10.1111/phpr.70074 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/phpr.70074 |
| format | Artículo Open Access |
| id | wiley_oa_10_1111_phpr_70074 |
| institution | Wiley Open Access |
| license_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | wiley_oa |
| spellingShingle | The Gradability of ‘Conscious’ Andrew Y. Lee Poppy Mankowitz Philosophy and Phenomenological Research The Gradability of ‘Conscious’ Andrew Y. Lee Poppy Mankowitz Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ABSTRACT Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a gradable adjective , meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more f than,” “slightly f ,” etc.) and that is associated with a degreed property. Both sides face an explanatory burden: they must explain why some competent speakers seem confused about the meaning of “conscious.” We argue that the question does make sense: “conscious” sometimes functions as a minimal‐standard gradable adjective. But we will also explain why some theorists have been skeptical about gradable uses of “conscious.” Along the way, we address the objection that many gradable constructions involving “what it's like” expressions are infelicitous, distinguish two interpretations of “phenomenal consciousness,” and discuss how our semantic arguments bear on the metaphysical question of whether consciousness comes in degrees. 10.1111/phpr.70074 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| title | The Gradability of ‘Conscious’ |
| topic | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| url | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.70074 |