Consciousness Doesn't Do That
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Wiley Open Access
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| Format: | Artículo Open Access |
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Wiley
2026
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| _version_ | 1867007693347094528 |
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| author | Matthias Michel |
| author_facet | Matthias Michel Matthias Michel |
| collection | Wiley Open Access |
| contents | Consciousness Doesn't Do That Matthias Michel Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ABSTRACT The question of which mental functions require consciousness has recently come to the forefront because of its relevance for investigating animal consciousness. Finding out that an animal can perform a function associated with consciousness would count as evidence that it has conscious states. I argue that most of the empirical research interpreted as showing that some functions are associated with consciousness fails to show this. Instead, it merely shows that the relevant functions falter when based on degraded sensory signals—which is unsurprising. This issue hinders empirical research on the functions associated with consciousness. I explain how consciousness research can do better when investigating the functions that require consciousness. Until the relevant research is properly carried out, the presence of functions supposedly associated with consciousness in nonhuman animals should not convince the skeptics one bit. 10.1111/phpr.70090 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/phpr.70090 |
| format | Artículo Open Access |
| id | wiley_oa_10_1111_phpr_70090 |
| institution | Wiley Open Access |
| license_str_mv | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | wiley_oa |
| spellingShingle | Consciousness Doesn't Do That Matthias Michel Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Consciousness Doesn't Do That Matthias Michel Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ABSTRACT The question of which mental functions require consciousness has recently come to the forefront because of its relevance for investigating animal consciousness. Finding out that an animal can perform a function associated with consciousness would count as evidence that it has conscious states. I argue that most of the empirical research interpreted as showing that some functions are associated with consciousness fails to show this. Instead, it merely shows that the relevant functions falter when based on degraded sensory signals—which is unsurprising. This issue hinders empirical research on the functions associated with consciousness. I explain how consciousness research can do better when investigating the functions that require consciousness. Until the relevant research is properly carried out, the presence of functions supposedly associated with consciousness in nonhuman animals should not convince the skeptics one bit. 10.1111/phpr.70090 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
| title | Consciousness Doesn't Do That |
| topic | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| url | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.70090 |