Verbal Metadisputes

Fuente: Wiley Open Access
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Autore principale: Alexander W. Kocurek
Natura: Artículo Open Access
Pubblicazione: Wiley 2026
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author Alexander W. Kocurek
author_facet Alexander W. Kocurek
Alexander W. Kocurek
collection Wiley Open Access
contents Verbal Metadisputes Alexander W. Kocurek Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ABSTRACT Many philosophical disputes have become so intractable that philosophers question whether there is a fact of the matter as to which side is right or whether these disputes are entirely verbal. Yet these “metadisputes” have also become intractable. This raises the question: Could they, too, be verbal? What would that even mean? Using tools from modal semantics, I develop a formal framework to help clarify and address these questions. I argue there are no universal diagnostic tests for assessing whether a dispute is verbal and that there may not even be a fact of the matter. I explore how and why that might be the case and what the consequences are for philosophical methodology. 10.1111/phpr.70121 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
doi_str_mv 10.1111/phpr.70121
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institution Wiley Open Access
license_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
publishDate 2026
publisher Wiley
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spellingShingle Verbal Metadisputes
Alexander W. Kocurek
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Verbal Metadisputes Alexander W. Kocurek Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ABSTRACT Many philosophical disputes have become so intractable that philosophers question whether there is a fact of the matter as to which side is right or whether these disputes are entirely verbal. Yet these “metadisputes” have also become intractable. This raises the question: Could they, too, be verbal? What would that even mean? Using tools from modal semantics, I develop a formal framework to help clarify and address these questions. I argue there are no universal diagnostic tests for assessing whether a dispute is verbal and that there may not even be a fact of the matter. I explore how and why that might be the case and what the consequences are for philosophical methodology. 10.1111/phpr.70121 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
title Verbal Metadisputes
topic Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
url https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.70121