Formal Proof of Hume's Is–Ought Gap via the Theory of Ontological Conflicts (TOC)
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2025
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| author | Ednyashev, Sanal |
| author_facet | Ednyashev, Sanal |
| contents | <p>This work presents a formal proof of David Hume’s “is–ought” problem using the Theory of Ontological Conflicts (TOC). The core idea is that normative statements (what ought to be) cannot be derived from factual statements (what is) without an ontological level shift, captured by the semantic invariant Δμ. The proof demonstrates that any attempt to move from a factual proposition to a normative conclusion necessarily implies a non-zero ontological distance (Δμ > 0). This formalism establishes a logical boundary between observation and prescription, providing a structural foundation for Hume’s Law and setting limits on the moral capacities of AI systems. The result has implications for ethics, legal AI, and epistemology.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_15513894 |
| institution | Zenodo |
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| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Formal Proof of Hume's Is–Ought Gap via the Theory of Ontological Conflicts (TOC) Ednyashev, Sanal <p>This work presents a formal proof of David Hume’s “is–ought” problem using the Theory of Ontological Conflicts (TOC). The core idea is that normative statements (what ought to be) cannot be derived from factual statements (what is) without an ontological level shift, captured by the semantic invariant Δμ. The proof demonstrates that any attempt to move from a factual proposition to a normative conclusion necessarily implies a non-zero ontological distance (Δμ > 0). This formalism establishes a logical boundary between observation and prescription, providing a structural foundation for Hume’s Law and setting limits on the moral capacities of AI systems. The result has implications for ethics, legal AI, and epistemology.</p> |
| title | Formal Proof of Hume's Is–Ought Gap via the Theory of Ontological Conflicts (TOC) |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15513894 |