Cyber-attack investigations on GFL and GFM inverters of a mi crogrid (CAILIM)
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866902192178331648 |
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| author | Kontou, Alkistis Feng, Zhiwang National Technical University of Athens University of Strathclyde |
| author_facet | Kontou, Alkistis Feng, Zhiwang National Technical University of Athens University of Strathclyde |
| contents | <p>This research investigates the impact of cyberattacks on inverter-based microgrids through two <br>distinct access periods, each focusing on different microgrid topologies and control layers. A <br>structured test plan, including preparatory modeling and proof-of-concept validation, ensured a <br>safe and effective transition to the experimental phase. <br>The research considered two microgrid topologies to assess the effects of cyberattacks. The first <br>access period involved a microgrid comprising Grid-Forming (GFM) and Grid-Following (GFL) <br>inverters, with attacks targeting the Phase-Locked Loop (PLL) of the GFL inverter at the primary <br>control level. The cyberattack in this phase involved the malicious reduction of the PLL’s PI gains <br>in the GFL inverter, impairing frequency tracking performance. The second access period in<br>volved a microgrid consisting solely of GFM inverters, with attacks introducing False Data Injec<br>tion (FDI) to the secondary control of one inverter. The cyberattack in this phase involved an <br>adversary manipulating the sensor/metering device of one GFM inverter, introducing a constant <br>disturbance to the reference frequency of the distributed secondary controller. In both cases, <br>inverters were droop-controlled with d-axis priority current limitation. Both experimental phases <br>were validated using Power Hardware-in-the-Loop (PHIL) setups. <br>In conclusion, this research successfully validated the two initial hypotheses, demonstrating that <br>cyberattacks at different control levels can significantly impact microgrid performance. The find<br>ings emphasize the critical role of control strategies and highlight how proper selection of droop <br>gains can enhance cyber resilience, serving as a passive defence mechanism. These insights <br>contribute to the development of more secure and reliable inverter-dominated microgrids.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_16846322 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Cyber-attack investigations on GFL and GFM inverters of a mi crogrid (CAILIM) Kontou, Alkistis Feng, Zhiwang National Technical University of Athens University of Strathclyde CAILIM Lab Access User Project Report European Union (EU) H2020 ERIGrid 2.0 GA 870620 <p>This research investigates the impact of cyberattacks on inverter-based microgrids through two <br>distinct access periods, each focusing on different microgrid topologies and control layers. A <br>structured test plan, including preparatory modeling and proof-of-concept validation, ensured a <br>safe and effective transition to the experimental phase. <br>The research considered two microgrid topologies to assess the effects of cyberattacks. The first <br>access period involved a microgrid comprising Grid-Forming (GFM) and Grid-Following (GFL) <br>inverters, with attacks targeting the Phase-Locked Loop (PLL) of the GFL inverter at the primary <br>control level. The cyberattack in this phase involved the malicious reduction of the PLL’s PI gains <br>in the GFL inverter, impairing frequency tracking performance. The second access period in<br>volved a microgrid consisting solely of GFM inverters, with attacks introducing False Data Injec<br>tion (FDI) to the secondary control of one inverter. The cyberattack in this phase involved an <br>adversary manipulating the sensor/metering device of one GFM inverter, introducing a constant <br>disturbance to the reference frequency of the distributed secondary controller. In both cases, <br>inverters were droop-controlled with d-axis priority current limitation. Both experimental phases <br>were validated using Power Hardware-in-the-Loop (PHIL) setups. <br>In conclusion, this research successfully validated the two initial hypotheses, demonstrating that <br>cyberattacks at different control levels can significantly impact microgrid performance. The find<br>ings emphasize the critical role of control strategies and highlight how proper selection of droop <br>gains can enhance cyber resilience, serving as a passive defence mechanism. These insights <br>contribute to the development of more secure and reliable inverter-dominated microgrids.</p> |
| title | Cyber-attack investigations on GFL and GFM inverters of a mi crogrid (CAILIM) |
| topic | CAILIM Lab Access User Project Report European Union (EU) H2020 ERIGrid 2.0 GA 870620 |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16846322 |