Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Recurso digital |
| Language: | |
| Published: |
Zenodo
2025
|
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17365632 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866901718172696576 |
|---|---|
| author | Andreea Blezneag |
| author_facet | Andreea Blezneag |
| contents | <p>This paper explores the concept of the virtual organization as a flexible and adaptive structure that emerged in response to the rapidly changing business environment of the 20th century. Unlike traditional hierarchical organizations, virtual organizations consist of independent entities that collaborate by sharing resources and expertise, relying on mutual trust and understanding instead of formal control mechanisms.</p> <p>Drawing on John Nash’s Game Theory, the study suggests that equilibrium points—where each party’s strategy aligns with others—can be achieved within virtual organizations to optimize collective performance. However, coordination and matching problems often arise due to the absence of binding agreements. The paper concludes that by identifying and resolving these coordination issues, virtual organizations can improve efficiency, stability, and inter-party collaboration.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_17365632 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Video - An Empirical Investigation into the Matching Problems among Game Theoretically Coordinating Parties in a Virtual Organization Andreea Blezneag <p>This paper explores the concept of the virtual organization as a flexible and adaptive structure that emerged in response to the rapidly changing business environment of the 20th century. Unlike traditional hierarchical organizations, virtual organizations consist of independent entities that collaborate by sharing resources and expertise, relying on mutual trust and understanding instead of formal control mechanisms.</p> <p>Drawing on John Nash’s Game Theory, the study suggests that equilibrium points—where each party’s strategy aligns with others—can be achieved within virtual organizations to optimize collective performance. However, coordination and matching problems often arise due to the absence of binding agreements. The paper concludes that by identifying and resolving these coordination issues, virtual organizations can improve efficiency, stability, and inter-party collaboration.</p> |
| title | Video - An Empirical Investigation into the Matching Problems among Game Theoretically Coordinating Parties in a Virtual Organization |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17365632 |