Trademark Governance Reform: A Cost-Filter Approach to Curb Malicious Trademark Squatting
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| Natura: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2025
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| _version_ | 1866901667751919616 |
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| author | Xu, Lucas Xiaochun |
| author_facet | Xu, Lucas Xiaochun |
| contents | <h2><strong>Abstract</strong></h2> <p>Trademark squatting has become a persistent governance challenge in China and many emerging markets. Traditional regulatory responses—tightening examination standards, increasing penalties, and promoting public awareness—have produced limited structural impact because they attempt to correct human judgment errors or reshape social norms at scale, both of which are slow, costly, and inherently unreliable. This paper proposes a systemic reform based on a <em>cost-filter mechanism</em>, arguing that the core problem is not insufficient legal doctrine but the existence of a nearly zero-cost registration channel that enables large-scale speculative filings.</p> <p>Drawing on congestion pricing theory and market design logic, the paper introduces a four-tier differentiated pricing model for trademark applications, which raises registration costs proportionally to filing volume, category breadth, and the speculative risk profile of applicants. This model preserves access for genuine business users while sharply increasing the marginal cost of bulk filings, thereby eliminating the economic incentive for malicious trademark hoarding. The paper further analyzes administrative constraints within China’s current governance structure—budgetary pressures, institutional risk aversion, KPI-driven scoring logic, and concerns over equity—and evaluates how they impede the adoption of price-based regulatory tools despite their effectiveness.</p> <p>The proposed reform aims to shift trademark governance from a labor-intensive, adjudication-driven paradigm to a scalable, incentive-compatible system that filters out malicious actors ex ante while reducing enforcement burdens ex post. This framework offers actionable paths for China and other jurisdictions facing similar trademark congestion problems and provides a policy blueprint for transitioning toward more efficient, market-oriented intellectual property governance.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_17709899 |
| institution | Zenodo |
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| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Trademark Governance Reform: A Cost-Filter Approach to Curb Malicious Trademark Squatting Xu, Lucas Xiaochun Trademark squatting Cost-filter mechanism Congestion pricing Intellectual property governance Market-based regulation Speculative filings Trademark examination reform China IP policy Administrative capacity Differentiated pricing model <h2><strong>Abstract</strong></h2> <p>Trademark squatting has become a persistent governance challenge in China and many emerging markets. Traditional regulatory responses—tightening examination standards, increasing penalties, and promoting public awareness—have produced limited structural impact because they attempt to correct human judgment errors or reshape social norms at scale, both of which are slow, costly, and inherently unreliable. This paper proposes a systemic reform based on a <em>cost-filter mechanism</em>, arguing that the core problem is not insufficient legal doctrine but the existence of a nearly zero-cost registration channel that enables large-scale speculative filings.</p> <p>Drawing on congestion pricing theory and market design logic, the paper introduces a four-tier differentiated pricing model for trademark applications, which raises registration costs proportionally to filing volume, category breadth, and the speculative risk profile of applicants. This model preserves access for genuine business users while sharply increasing the marginal cost of bulk filings, thereby eliminating the economic incentive for malicious trademark hoarding. The paper further analyzes administrative constraints within China’s current governance structure—budgetary pressures, institutional risk aversion, KPI-driven scoring logic, and concerns over equity—and evaluates how they impede the adoption of price-based regulatory tools despite their effectiveness.</p> <p>The proposed reform aims to shift trademark governance from a labor-intensive, adjudication-driven paradigm to a scalable, incentive-compatible system that filters out malicious actors ex ante while reducing enforcement burdens ex post. This framework offers actionable paths for China and other jurisdictions facing similar trademark congestion problems and provides a policy blueprint for transitioning toward more efficient, market-oriented intellectual property governance.</p> |
| title | Trademark Governance Reform: A Cost-Filter Approach to Curb Malicious Trademark Squatting |
| topic | Trademark squatting Cost-filter mechanism Congestion pricing Intellectual property governance Market-based regulation Speculative filings Trademark examination reform China IP policy Administrative capacity Differentiated pricing model |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17709899 |