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| Formato: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17728541 |
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| author | Revista, Zen GEOGRAPHY, 10 |
| author_facet | Revista, Zen GEOGRAPHY, 10 |
| contents | This paper explores the intricate relationship between electoral geographies and the concept of supranational sovereignty, arguing that systemic biases in the representation and decision-making structures of international organizations can create a form of "gerrymandering" that limits their effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. While traditional gerrymandering refers to the manipulation of electoral district boundaries for political advantage at the national level, this study extends the concept to the supranational sphere, examining how varied national populations, diverse electoral systems, and weighted voting mechanisms within bodies like the European Union or the United Nations can lead to disproportionate influence and outcomes. By analyzing the spatial distribution of political power and its translation into policy, we demonstrate how these electoral geographies distort the principle of equal representation among member states or citizens, thereby challenging the ideal of a truly collective and sovereign supranational entity. The paper contributes to understanding the democratic deficits of international governance and offers conceptual tools for assessing the fairness and representativeness of supranational decision-making, ultimately revealing how power is geographically configured and constrained within global political architecture. |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_17728541 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | The Gerrymandered Union: Electoral Geographies and the Limits of Supranational Sovereignty Revista, Zen GEOGRAPHY, 10 This paper explores the intricate relationship between electoral geographies and the concept of supranational sovereignty, arguing that systemic biases in the representation and decision-making structures of international organizations can create a form of "gerrymandering" that limits their effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. While traditional gerrymandering refers to the manipulation of electoral district boundaries for political advantage at the national level, this study extends the concept to the supranational sphere, examining how varied national populations, diverse electoral systems, and weighted voting mechanisms within bodies like the European Union or the United Nations can lead to disproportionate influence and outcomes. By analyzing the spatial distribution of political power and its translation into policy, we demonstrate how these electoral geographies distort the principle of equal representation among member states or citizens, thereby challenging the ideal of a truly collective and sovereign supranational entity. The paper contributes to understanding the democratic deficits of international governance and offers conceptual tools for assessing the fairness and representativeness of supranational decision-making, ultimately revealing how power is geographically configured and constrained within global political architecture. |
| title | The Gerrymandered Union: Electoral Geographies and the Limits of Supranational Sovereignty |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17728541 |