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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2025
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17758356 |
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Table of Contents:
- This paper explores the intricate relationship between Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism and the synthetic a priori nature of the moral law, particularly focusing on the concept of duty. Kant argued that moral duties are not derived from empirical experience nor are they mere analytic truths; rather, they are synthetic a priori judgments, possessing universal necessity and originating from pure reason. We delve into how Kant's transcendental idealism, by positing that the human mind actively constitutes experience rather than passively receiving it, provides the epistemological framework necessary to justify the possibility of such synthetic a priori moral principles. The moral law, expressed through the Categorical Imperative, is shown to be a product of pure practical reason, independent of inclination and contingent circumstances. This autonomy of the will, capable of legislating universal moral laws, is intelligible only within the noumenal realm, which is made coherent by transcendental idealism's distinction between phenomena and noumena. The paper demonstrates that the necessity and universality of duty, far from being an empirical observation or a tautology, are grounded in the very structure of rational agency, understood through Kant's critical philosophy.