| _version_ | 1866901651977142272 |
|---|---|
| author | Revista, Zen PHILOSOPHY, 10 |
| author_facet | Revista, Zen PHILOSOPHY, 10 |
| contents | This paper explores the intricate and often precarious relationship between human agency, metaphysical anti-realism, the persistence of persons, and the attribution of moral responsibility. We argue that certain anti-realist stances regarding moral properties or even the nature of the self can significantly undermine common understandings of agency, thereby exposing its inherent fragility. This "fragility of agency" framework, introduced here as a critical lens, highlights the synergistic pressures exerted by meta-ethical anti-realism and challenges to personal persistence. The debate between moral realism and anti-realism, particularly concerning the existence of objective moral values, has profound implications for how we conceive of agents as morally responsible beings. Furthermore, the philosophical problem of personal persistence over time—what makes a person the same individual from one moment to the next—is shown to be crucial for establishing coherent grounds for retrospective moral responsibility. By examining various forms of anti-realism, from non-cognitivism to error theory, and their interaction with theories of diachronic personal identity, this paper aims to elucidate the metaphysical preconditions necessary for a robust conception of agency and, consequently, for a meaningful system of moral accountability. Ultimately, it suggests that even if full-blown realism about agency and identity proves untenable, pragmatic considerations may still necessitate maintaining certain concepts of moral responsibility, albeit on revised, potentially more fragile, foundations. |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_17758539 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | The Fragility of Agency: Anti-Realism, Persistence, and Moral Responsibility Revista, Zen PHILOSOPHY, 10 This paper explores the intricate and often precarious relationship between human agency, metaphysical anti-realism, the persistence of persons, and the attribution of moral responsibility. We argue that certain anti-realist stances regarding moral properties or even the nature of the self can significantly undermine common understandings of agency, thereby exposing its inherent fragility. This "fragility of agency" framework, introduced here as a critical lens, highlights the synergistic pressures exerted by meta-ethical anti-realism and challenges to personal persistence. The debate between moral realism and anti-realism, particularly concerning the existence of objective moral values, has profound implications for how we conceive of agents as morally responsible beings. Furthermore, the philosophical problem of personal persistence over time—what makes a person the same individual from one moment to the next—is shown to be crucial for establishing coherent grounds for retrospective moral responsibility. By examining various forms of anti-realism, from non-cognitivism to error theory, and their interaction with theories of diachronic personal identity, this paper aims to elucidate the metaphysical preconditions necessary for a robust conception of agency and, consequently, for a meaningful system of moral accountability. Ultimately, it suggests that even if full-blown realism about agency and identity proves untenable, pragmatic considerations may still necessitate maintaining certain concepts of moral responsibility, albeit on revised, potentially more fragile, foundations. |
| title | The Fragility of Agency: Anti-Realism, Persistence, and Moral Responsibility |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17758539 |