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| Format: | Recurso digital |
| Language: | English |
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Zenodo
2025
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17814472 |
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| _version_ | 1866901967386705920 |
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| author | Sharma, Amit |
| author_facet | Sharma, Amit |
| contents | <p>May 2025- Pakistan’s new Fatah-II guided rocket system significantly enhances its long-range precision-strike capability. With a fast, low-altitude “kryptonite” flight profile, heavy 365-kg warhead, and terminal guidance, it sharply reduces interception windows and threatens India’s rear-area infrastructure. Lessons from Ukraine, Gaza, and Nagorno-Karabakh show how such guided rockets can overwhelm outdated air defence and demand layered sensors, integrated air-defence networks, and strong EW support. India has begun upgrading radars, SAM tiers, and EW suites to counter this threat. Ultimately, Fatah-II signals a regional shift: battlefield rocket artillery is becoming precise, fast, and hard to stop, forcing both India and Pakistan to rethink doctrine, defence, and escalation dynamics.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_17814472 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Fatha-2 Sharma, Amit guided rockets, low-altitude trajectory, precision strike systems, rocket artillery, terminal guidance, INS GNSS navigation, layered air defence, counter-rocket interception, networked radars, electronic warfare, saturation attacks, mobile launchers, air defence suppression, regional deterrence, long-range strike capability, Indian Army, India, Pakistan Army, Pakistan, Op Sindoor, Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos, Sirsa, Delhi, Let, Pahalgam, Terrorists, <p>May 2025- Pakistan’s new Fatah-II guided rocket system significantly enhances its long-range precision-strike capability. With a fast, low-altitude “kryptonite” flight profile, heavy 365-kg warhead, and terminal guidance, it sharply reduces interception windows and threatens India’s rear-area infrastructure. Lessons from Ukraine, Gaza, and Nagorno-Karabakh show how such guided rockets can overwhelm outdated air defence and demand layered sensors, integrated air-defence networks, and strong EW support. India has begun upgrading radars, SAM tiers, and EW suites to counter this threat. Ultimately, Fatah-II signals a regional shift: battlefield rocket artillery is becoming precise, fast, and hard to stop, forcing both India and Pakistan to rethink doctrine, defence, and escalation dynamics.</p> |
| title | Fatha-2 |
| topic | guided rockets, low-altitude trajectory, precision strike systems, rocket artillery, terminal guidance, INS GNSS navigation, layered air defence, counter-rocket interception, networked radars, electronic warfare, saturation attacks, mobile launchers, air defence suppression, regional deterrence, long-range strike capability, Indian Army, India, Pakistan Army, Pakistan, Op Sindoor, Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos, Sirsa, Delhi, Let, Pahalgam, Terrorists, |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17814472 |