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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Recurso digital |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Zenodo
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17946428 |
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Table of Contents:
- <p>Between 2010 and 2025, Hungary transformed from a consolidated European democracy into a competitive authoritarian regime, with media capture emerging as a central mechanism of this democratic backsliding. This dissertation investigates the causal relationship between media capture and electoral manipulation in Hungary through rigorous quantitative analysis complemented by qualitative case studies. Using four quasi-experimental identification strategies—difference-in-differences exploiting staggered media takeovers, synthetic control methods for nationwide consolidation events, instrumental variables addressing endogeneity concerns, and regression discontinuity designs leveraging electoral thresholds—the study establishes that media capture by the Fidesz government causally increased its electoral support by 8-12 percentage points. This effect is sufficiently large to be electorally decisive in competitive constituencies. Mediation analysis reveals that approximately 35-40% of this effect operates through information suppression, with citizens in captured media environments exhibiting substantially lower political knowledge. Affective polarization and media trust account for an additional 40-45% of the effect. Treatment effects exhibit systematic heterogeneity, proving three times larger among rural, older, and less-educated voters who rely more heavily on traditional broadcast media. Qualitative evidence from 23 elite interviews confirms that media capture was pursued as a deliberate electoral strategy, with systematic targeting of competitive constituencies. These findings advance democratic backsliding theory by establishing media capture as a primary mechanism rather than mere symptom of authoritarian reversion. The study demonstrates that complete media control generates electoral advantages sufficient to entrench competitive authoritarianism, effectively severing democratic accountability. Policy implications are stark: protecting media pluralism must be prioritized as foundational to democracy protection, and prevention is far more feasible than post-facto restoration once capture exceeds 70-80% market concentration. The Hungarian case serves as both warning and challenge for democracies worldwide facing similar information manipulation threats in the digital age.</p> <p><strong><br>**Keywords**: </strong>media capture, democratic backsliding, electoral manipulation, Hungary, causal inference, competitive authoritarianism, information suppression, media pluralism</p>