| _version_ | 1866901106517344256 |
|---|---|
| author | Surana, Jainil |
| author_facet | Surana, Jainil |
| contents | <p><span>Philosophy of science has long operated under the implicit assumption that genuine explanation requires reduction to more fundamental levels of description. This assumption has been reinforced by the historical success of microphysical explanation, leading to the widespread view that higher-level descriptions are at best heuristic and at worst illusory. At the same time, actual scientific practice relies irreducibly on multi-level explanations-spanning physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the social sciences-without treating these levels as interchangeable or eliminable.</span></p> <p><span>This tension reveals a conceptual gap: there is no widely accepted ontological account explaining how multiple descriptive levels can coexist without contradiction, redundancy, or ontological inflation. Reductionism explains inter-level relations but struggles to justify the continued explanatory legitimacy of higher-level descriptions.</span></p> <p><span>This paper proposes a structural resolution through the Three-Circle Ontology, a meta-ontological framework that distinguishes explanation from reduction by grounding levels of description ontologically rather than methodologically. Within this framework, explanatory adequacy is understood as level-relative satisfaction of structural constraints, not as elimination in favor of a privileged fundamental description.</span></p> <p><span>The account does not introduce a new scientific methodology, does not challenge the empirical success of reductionist explanations, and does not endorse metaphysical pluralism. Its primary contribution is a conceptual reframing of explanation as structurally constrained, level-relative understanding rather than ontological reduction.</span></p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_18001991 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Explanation, Reduction, and Levels of Description: A Structural Ontological Account Surana, Jainil Philosophy of Science Metaphysics and Epistemology Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Scientific Explanation Ontology Explanation Reductionism Levels of Description Structural Explanation Explanatory Pluralism Scientific Models Special Sciences Emergence Structural Constraints Ontological Levels Methodological Pluralism Interdisciplinary Explanation Structural Realism Theory Reduction Model-Based Explanation Constraint Satisfaction Scientific Practice Three-Circle Ontology <p><span>Philosophy of science has long operated under the implicit assumption that genuine explanation requires reduction to more fundamental levels of description. This assumption has been reinforced by the historical success of microphysical explanation, leading to the widespread view that higher-level descriptions are at best heuristic and at worst illusory. At the same time, actual scientific practice relies irreducibly on multi-level explanations-spanning physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the social sciences-without treating these levels as interchangeable or eliminable.</span></p> <p><span>This tension reveals a conceptual gap: there is no widely accepted ontological account explaining how multiple descriptive levels can coexist without contradiction, redundancy, or ontological inflation. Reductionism explains inter-level relations but struggles to justify the continued explanatory legitimacy of higher-level descriptions.</span></p> <p><span>This paper proposes a structural resolution through the Three-Circle Ontology, a meta-ontological framework that distinguishes explanation from reduction by grounding levels of description ontologically rather than methodologically. Within this framework, explanatory adequacy is understood as level-relative satisfaction of structural constraints, not as elimination in favor of a privileged fundamental description.</span></p> <p><span>The account does not introduce a new scientific methodology, does not challenge the empirical success of reductionist explanations, and does not endorse metaphysical pluralism. Its primary contribution is a conceptual reframing of explanation as structurally constrained, level-relative understanding rather than ontological reduction.</span></p> |
| title | Explanation, Reduction, and Levels of Description: A Structural Ontological Account |
| topic | Philosophy of Science Metaphysics and Epistemology Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Scientific Explanation Ontology Explanation Reductionism Levels of Description Structural Explanation Explanatory Pluralism Scientific Models Special Sciences Emergence Structural Constraints Ontological Levels Methodological Pluralism Interdisciplinary Explanation Structural Realism Theory Reduction Model-Based Explanation Constraint Satisfaction Scientific Practice Three-Circle Ontology |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18001991 |