The Sovereign Veto: Can the 2026 Referendum Overrule the Basic Structure Doctrine?
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| Format: | Recurso digital |
| Langue: | anglais |
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Zenodo
2025
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| _version_ | 1866902005105033216 |
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| author | Constitution Watchdog |
| author_facet | Constitution Watchdog |
| contents | <p>This white paper originates at the intersection of constitutional rigidity and revolutionary necessity. Following the 2024 Uprising, Bangladesh confronts a “jurisprudential singularity,” a rare historical moment where the existing constitutional framework is rigorously tested by the ascent of a sovereign people.</p> <p>As the Drafting Committee, our objective is to bridge the gap between “Old Order” legality and “New Order” legitimacy. We posit that the proposed 2026 Referendum serves not merely as a political instrument, but as a formal exercise of Primary Constituent Power. Consequently, this paper functions as a theoretical inquiry into whether the “Fortress of the Basic Structure,” codified in Article 7B, can be legally bypassed by a direct plebiscite without precipitating a collapse of the Rule of Law.</p> <p><br>We invite the reader to view this work not as an exercise in advocacy, but as a rigorous analysis of Revolutionary Legality. This analysis does not advocate for the abrogation of the Constitution, but rather explores the jurisprudential mechanisms for its lawful evolution under the Doctrine of Necessity and Popular Sovereignty. Our aim is to determine if the “July Charter” possesses the requisite authority to legitimately reset the legal clock of the Republic.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_18001995 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | The Sovereign Veto: Can the 2026 Referendum Overrule the Basic Structure Doctrine? Constitution Watchdog White-paper <p>This white paper originates at the intersection of constitutional rigidity and revolutionary necessity. Following the 2024 Uprising, Bangladesh confronts a “jurisprudential singularity,” a rare historical moment where the existing constitutional framework is rigorously tested by the ascent of a sovereign people.</p> <p>As the Drafting Committee, our objective is to bridge the gap between “Old Order” legality and “New Order” legitimacy. We posit that the proposed 2026 Referendum serves not merely as a political instrument, but as a formal exercise of Primary Constituent Power. Consequently, this paper functions as a theoretical inquiry into whether the “Fortress of the Basic Structure,” codified in Article 7B, can be legally bypassed by a direct plebiscite without precipitating a collapse of the Rule of Law.</p> <p><br>We invite the reader to view this work not as an exercise in advocacy, but as a rigorous analysis of Revolutionary Legality. This analysis does not advocate for the abrogation of the Constitution, but rather explores the jurisprudential mechanisms for its lawful evolution under the Doctrine of Necessity and Popular Sovereignty. Our aim is to determine if the “July Charter” possesses the requisite authority to legitimately reset the legal clock of the Republic.</p> |
| title | The Sovereign Veto: Can the 2026 Referendum Overrule the Basic Structure Doctrine? |
| topic | White-paper |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18001995 |