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| Format: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2025
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18005727 |
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Table of Contents:
- <p>This paper argues that social truth is not discovered in the same manner as scientific truth, but constructed through human participation, narrative fabrication, and the selective realization of possibilities. While correspondence to facts remains central in the natural sciences, it is insufficient to explain how truth operates in technological and social domains. Drawing on a phenomenological account of selfhood and a modal conception of reality as a field of unrealized possibilities, the paper proposes a three-domain ontology distinguishing natural science, technology, and social reality. Within this framework, technology is understood as the fabrication of artifacts constrained by natural laws, while social reality functions as a normative technology embedded within nature. The mechanisms of social selection are elaborated through engagement with Bourdieu's theory of habitus and Butler's account of performativity, showing how embodied dispositions and iterated practices stabilize certain possibilities while foreclosing others. From this perspective, lying is reinterpreted not merely as moral failure or epistemic error, but as a counterfactual or premature commitment to an unrealized possible world. The paper critically engages correspondence realism, deflationary theories of truth, and pragmatist alternatives, including a direct rebuttal to the reductionist objection that social facts are ultimately reducible to physical or psychological states. It concludes that understanding truth as "in the making" does not undermine objectivity or responsibility; rather, it clarifies the distinctive mechanisms through which different domains generate, stabilize, and sometimes distort truth, while heightening accountability for the worlds we help construct.</p>