GAME THEORETICAL MODELING OF VACCINE HESITANCY AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS
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| Natura: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2026
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| _version_ | 1866901851050344448 |
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| author | A. Dinesh Kumar, Jerryson Ameworgbe Gidisu, Mbonigaba Celestin & M. Vasuki |
| author_facet | A. Dinesh Kumar, Jerryson Ameworgbe Gidisu, Mbonigaba Celestin & M. Vasuki |
| contents | <p><span>Why do people resist vaccines even when their lives are at risk? Game theory reveals that vaccine hesitancy is often a strategic response, influenced by peer behavior, institutional trust, and perceived costs. This study modeled vaccine decision-making using game-theoretical variables and assessed their impact on campaign outcomes in Ghana from 2020 to 2024. Using 105 region-month secondary observations and applying correlation and multiple regression analysis, the study examined how payoff structures, strategy dynamics, and equilibrium tools influenced vaccine uptake, refusal rates, herd immunity, and outbreak response times. Key results showed weak correlations, with payoff structures negatively associated with campaign impact (r = -0.146) and equilibrium analysis tools positively correlated (r = 0.076). Regression analysis revealed low explanatory power (R² = 0.030), yet descriptive findings confirmed that game theory-based campaigns led to a 54% uptake versus 31% in traditional methods. Despite statistical limitations, strategic modeling facilitated faster response times and improved cooperation. The study concludes that game theory can reshape public health planning, especially when integrated with digital trust strategies and micro-targeted incentives. Recommendations include training campaign designers in strategic modeling, embedding dynamic payoff matrices in mobile outreach, and institutionalizing adaptive feedback systems for behavioral surveillance.</span></p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_18055902 |
| institution | Zenodo |
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| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | GAME THEORETICAL MODELING OF VACCINE HESITANCY AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS A. Dinesh Kumar, Jerryson Ameworgbe Gidisu, Mbonigaba Celestin & M. Vasuki <p><span>Why do people resist vaccines even when their lives are at risk? Game theory reveals that vaccine hesitancy is often a strategic response, influenced by peer behavior, institutional trust, and perceived costs. This study modeled vaccine decision-making using game-theoretical variables and assessed their impact on campaign outcomes in Ghana from 2020 to 2024. Using 105 region-month secondary observations and applying correlation and multiple regression analysis, the study examined how payoff structures, strategy dynamics, and equilibrium tools influenced vaccine uptake, refusal rates, herd immunity, and outbreak response times. Key results showed weak correlations, with payoff structures negatively associated with campaign impact (r = -0.146) and equilibrium analysis tools positively correlated (r = 0.076). Regression analysis revealed low explanatory power (R² = 0.030), yet descriptive findings confirmed that game theory-based campaigns led to a 54% uptake versus 31% in traditional methods. Despite statistical limitations, strategic modeling facilitated faster response times and improved cooperation. The study concludes that game theory can reshape public health planning, especially when integrated with digital trust strategies and micro-targeted incentives. Recommendations include training campaign designers in strategic modeling, embedding dynamic payoff matrices in mobile outreach, and institutionalizing adaptive feedback systems for behavioral surveillance.</span></p> |
| title | GAME THEORETICAL MODELING OF VACCINE HESITANCY AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18055902 |