Stochastic Stability of Ordinal Aggregation under Majorization Dynamics: A Drift–Diffusion Analysis of Political Failure Modes

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Main Author: Fathi, Kevin
Format: Recurso digital
Language:English
Published: Zenodo 2026
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author Fathi, Kevin
author_facet Fathi, Kevin
contents <p>Classical social choice theory is organized around “no-go” results: Arrow’s impossibility<br>theorem and Condorcet cycles show that no ordinal aggregation rule can universally convert<br>individual rankings into a coherent transitive social ordering while satisfying minimal fairness<br>axioms. This paper pivots from the static existence question to a dynamic stability question.<br>We treat paradoxes as regimes of a stochastic dynamical system.<br><br>Our first contribution is a measurement layer that replaces an often-undefined social ranking<br>with an observable state variable: the ordinal-profile distribution p over ballot types or joint<br>ordinal profiles. Majorization (equivalently Lorenz order) supplies a label-free concentration<br>order on p, and Shannon ordinal majorization entropy (OME) supplies a scalar potential that is<br>ordinally invariant and exactly decomposable across subgroups. We provide full proofs of Lorenz<br>consistency, decomposability, and a characterization theorem identifying Shannon entropy as the<br>unique continuous Lorenz-monotone refinement-decomposable index (up to positive scale).<br><br>Our second contribution is a dynamical layer based on Dynamic Inequality Equilibrium (DIE):<br>we map political dynamics into a two-dimensional phase space Φ = (M, D) where D is Lorenz<br>drift (an inequality-velocity statistic) and M is rank mobility (a micro-turbulence statistic). We<br>prove that a persistent Condorcet cycle is a churning equilibrium: macro-stationary (D = 0) but<br>micro-volatile (M is order one).<br><br>Our third contribution is a mechanism design result. We formalize a constitutional circuit<br>breaker as an affine reinjection (restart) update pt+1 = (1 − ε)Ppt + εs, which is exactly the<br>PageRank/random-walk-with-restart operator. A contraction theorem guarantees convergence<br>to a unique stationary distribution for any ε > 0, damping persistent cycling without pretending<br>to “solve” Arrow.</p>
format Recurso digital
id zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_18156054
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language eng
publishDate 2026
publisher Zenodo
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spellingShingle Stochastic Stability of Ordinal Aggregation under Majorization Dynamics: A Drift–Diffusion Analysis of Political Failure Modes
Fathi, Kevin
social choice theory
ordinal aggregation
majorization dynamics
Dynamic Inequality Equilibrium
Lorenz order
Shannon entropy
Condorcet cycles
stochastic stability
political instability
PageRank mechanism
<p>Classical social choice theory is organized around “no-go” results: Arrow’s impossibility<br>theorem and Condorcet cycles show that no ordinal aggregation rule can universally convert<br>individual rankings into a coherent transitive social ordering while satisfying minimal fairness<br>axioms. This paper pivots from the static existence question to a dynamic stability question.<br>We treat paradoxes as regimes of a stochastic dynamical system.<br><br>Our first contribution is a measurement layer that replaces an often-undefined social ranking<br>with an observable state variable: the ordinal-profile distribution p over ballot types or joint<br>ordinal profiles. Majorization (equivalently Lorenz order) supplies a label-free concentration<br>order on p, and Shannon ordinal majorization entropy (OME) supplies a scalar potential that is<br>ordinally invariant and exactly decomposable across subgroups. We provide full proofs of Lorenz<br>consistency, decomposability, and a characterization theorem identifying Shannon entropy as the<br>unique continuous Lorenz-monotone refinement-decomposable index (up to positive scale).<br><br>Our second contribution is a dynamical layer based on Dynamic Inequality Equilibrium (DIE):<br>we map political dynamics into a two-dimensional phase space Φ = (M, D) where D is Lorenz<br>drift (an inequality-velocity statistic) and M is rank mobility (a micro-turbulence statistic). We<br>prove that a persistent Condorcet cycle is a churning equilibrium: macro-stationary (D = 0) but<br>micro-volatile (M is order one).<br><br>Our third contribution is a mechanism design result. We formalize a constitutional circuit<br>breaker as an affine reinjection (restart) update pt+1 = (1 − ε)Ppt + εs, which is exactly the<br>PageRank/random-walk-with-restart operator. A contraction theorem guarantees convergence<br>to a unique stationary distribution for any ε > 0, damping persistent cycling without pretending<br>to “solve” Arrow.</p>
title Stochastic Stability of Ordinal Aggregation under Majorization Dynamics: A Drift–Diffusion Analysis of Political Failure Modes
topic social choice theory
ordinal aggregation
majorization dynamics
Dynamic Inequality Equilibrium
Lorenz order
Shannon entropy
Condorcet cycles
stochastic stability
political instability
PageRank mechanism
url https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18156054