Arcaunt: A Scalable, Coercion-Resistant, and Accountable E-Voting Architecture via Anonymous Recovery Channels

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Hauptverfasser: Golemanov, Tzanko, GOLEMANOVA, EMILIA
Format: Recurso digital
Veröffentlicht: Zenodo 2026
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author Golemanov, Tzanko
GOLEMANOVA, EMILIA
author_facet Golemanov, Tzanko
GOLEMANOVA, EMILIA
contents <p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Abstract</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—</span><span lang="EN-US"> </span><span lang="EN-US">The digitization of democratic processes faces a persistent trilemma: achieving strong voter anonymity, end</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">to</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">end verifiability, and resilience against coercion and credential loss. Existing e</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">voting systems typically sacrifice recovery mechanisms to preserve anonymity or rely on persistent digital identities that introduce privacy and insider</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">threat risks. This paper presents Arcaunt (from "ARC" and "Accountability"), a scalable e</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">voting architecture that resolves these tensions through a hybrid design combining air</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">gapped physical credential distribution with an Anonymous Recovery Channel (ARC). ARC enables voters to autonomously revoke and replace compromised tokens without revealing personally identifiable information. We provide a comprehensive security analysis under a modified Dolev–Yao model, demonstrating resistance to coercion, insider attacks, client</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">side compromise, and vote</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">selling incentives. The architecture integrates SHA</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">3 hashing, ECC</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">based verification, and zk</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">SNARK proofs to ensure efficient revoting integrity. A performance evaluation shows that credential generation and ledger validation scale to national deployments, while a 10</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">year economic model indicates up to 96% cost reduction compared to traditional paper</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">based elections. A functional web prototype is under development to assess usability and real</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">world performance of the ARC and sequential validation mechanisms. Arcaunt offers a practical and accountable blueprint for global</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">scale digital democracy.</span></p> <p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Index Terms</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—E-voting, Arcaunt, Anonymous Recovery Channel (ARC), Coercion Resistance, SHA-3, Digital Democracy, GovTech, Zero-Knowledge Proofs.</span></p>
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spellingShingle Arcaunt: A Scalable, Coercion-Resistant, and Accountable E-Voting Architecture via Anonymous Recovery Channels
Golemanov, Tzanko
GOLEMANOVA, EMILIA
<p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Abstract</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—</span><span lang="EN-US"> </span><span lang="EN-US">The digitization of democratic processes faces a persistent trilemma: achieving strong voter anonymity, end</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">to</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">end verifiability, and resilience against coercion and credential loss. Existing e</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">voting systems typically sacrifice recovery mechanisms to preserve anonymity or rely on persistent digital identities that introduce privacy and insider</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">threat risks. This paper presents Arcaunt (from "ARC" and "Accountability"), a scalable e</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">voting architecture that resolves these tensions through a hybrid design combining air</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">gapped physical credential distribution with an Anonymous Recovery Channel (ARC). ARC enables voters to autonomously revoke and replace compromised tokens without revealing personally identifiable information. We provide a comprehensive security analysis under a modified Dolev–Yao model, demonstrating resistance to coercion, insider attacks, client</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">side compromise, and vote</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">selling incentives. The architecture integrates SHA</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">3 hashing, ECC</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">based verification, and zk</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">SNARK proofs to ensure efficient revoting integrity. A performance evaluation shows that credential generation and ledger validation scale to national deployments, while a 10</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">year economic model indicates up to 96% cost reduction compared to traditional paper</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">based elections. A functional web prototype is under development to assess usability and real</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">world performance of the ARC and sequential validation mechanisms. Arcaunt offers a practical and accountable blueprint for global</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">scale digital democracy.</span></p> <p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Index Terms</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—E-voting, Arcaunt, Anonymous Recovery Channel (ARC), Coercion Resistance, SHA-3, Digital Democracy, GovTech, Zero-Knowledge Proofs.</span></p>
title Arcaunt: A Scalable, Coercion-Resistant, and Accountable E-Voting Architecture via Anonymous Recovery Channels
url https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18247837